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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

An Analysis of the Domestic Ferry Safety and the

Pre-Departure Inspection Enforcement in the Philippines
Degree:

Master of Science

Philippines domestic ferry safety is very notorious, globally, for its humongous count
of fatalities in its record. Relatively, the ferry industry faces a number of serious
maritime safety challenges. Also, most often than not, the Philippine Coast Guard is
put on the bad light by the press every time there are sea mishaps because it is
mandated to conduct PDI on all domestic watercrafts prior sailing. Because of the
limited understanding, the public, through the press, blindly believes that predeparture inspection shortcomings entirely cause the maritime accidents.
In this regard, this research aims to extract and analyze the domestic ferry causal
factors vis-a-vis with PDI accident-related causal factors and further identify the PDI’s
strengths and weaknesses. As such, HFACS and Accimap accident causation models
were employed as a tool to achieve the above objective.
The results showed that the Philippines domestic ferry industry has a poor safety
culture demonstrated by the numerous violations and errors of safety rules and
regulations committed in the various levels of the ferry organization. Relatedly,
shortcomings in the safety enforcement ushers the proliferation of said safety
violations and lapses.
Also, analysis of the identified accident causal factors from both the domestic ferry
industry and PDI highlights that PDI is only effective in ocular inspections of items that
are tangible. On the other hand, PDI inspectors have difficulties and are not so
effective in technical matters like determining ferry seaworthiness and stability and
crew competence because such are beyond the capability of the naked eyes.
Furthermore, a substantial number of accident causal factors are not covered by PDI
and needs to be addressed by other safety enforcement activities.
Furthermore, the findings show that enforcement gaps stem from the various
government agencies' fragmented, loose and unverified safety enforcement activities,
which are exacerbated by the lack of a centralized safety enforcement information
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system policy and infrastructure, as well as safety inspectors' performance oversight,
to establish control over the ferry industry and the government's regulators.
KEYWORDS: Domestic Ferry Safety, Pre-Departure Inspection, MCI Reports,
HFACS, AcciMap, Accident causal factors, Interrelationships
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of time up to the present, ferries and waterways, alike, have served
as an important and effective mode of transportation around the world. (Passenger
Ferries – An Effective Mode of Transportation, 2017). In the absence of infrastructures
such as roads and bridges, ferries and bodies of water jointly linked people,
communities, societies, and civilizations and facilitated their individual and mercantile
free movement. Inevitably, this feat, further, paved the way for people's lives'
betterment and national progress. However, this maritime sector is not spared from
human frailties and the wrath of nature, thus, resulting in mishaps. Relatedly, this
paper intends to examine these ferry accidents.

1.1 Background
According to Oxford Dictionary (2010), by definition, “a ferry is a boat or ship for
conveying passengers and goods, especially over a relatively short distance and as
a regular service.” Furthermore, ferries can range in size from tiny boats transporting
passengers across a harbor, lake, or river to massive ocean-going ships transporting
passengers, vehicles, trucks, and other heavy goods over long distances requiring
overnight sleeping facilities (Interferry, 2021).

Moreover, ferry operations play a critical role in the movement of people and products
between islands, along the coast, and through inland waterways and riverine systems
(China, 2019). The global ferry sector is comparable in size to that of commercial
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airlines, conveying around 2.1 billion passengers per year, as well as 250 million
vehicles and 32 million trailers (not including China) (Interferry, 2021).

According to Interferry (2021 as cited in China, 2019), frequent ferry accidents, mostly
involving domestic ferries, have resulted in a huge number of fatalities. Over 60,000
people have died in ship accidents in the last 50 years. From 2000 to 2014, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh were the top 3 countries with the most
number of ferry accidents (Golden, 2015).

Relatedly, the Philippines is a sovereign archipelagic country with over 7,107 islands
and a total area of over 300,000 square kilometers. Vietnam borders it on the west,
Taiwan on the north, Indonesia on the south, Malaysia on the southwest, and Palau
on the east (Mendoza, 2015). In terms of economic and social activity, the Philippines
is inextricably linked and reliant on the maritime domain due to its geographical
configuration, as shown in Figure 1-1 (Angeles,2015).

Because of the country's archipelagic character and relatively long coastline, coastal
provinces, cities, and towns make up a larger proportion of the country's provinces,
cities, and towns than landlocked provinces, cities, and towns. Coastal provinces
account for 66 (or 81.48 percent) of the 81 provinces. Twelve of the 15 landlocked
provinces are located on the island of Luzon, while three are located on the island of
Mindanao. The cities along the shore outweigh those on the land by a factor of 88 (or
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60.69%). (57). The majority of the municipalities, 812 (or 54.53 percent), are also
coastal, while 677 are landlocked. (Philippines – PhilAtlas, 1903).

Furthermore, the Philippines coastline stretches up to 36,289 kilometers. The
numbers of its seas, gulfs, bays, straits, lakes, and rivers are 8, 8, 30, 24, 100, and
412, respectively. However, the Philippines, which is located along the Pacific
typhoon belt, is hit by an average of 20 typhoons each year, five of which are
destructive (Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), 2019).

Figure 1-1 Political Map of the Philippines (klaus kästle - nationsonline.org, 1998)
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Relatedly, the Philippines domestic ferry safety is very notorious globally for its high
number of sea accidents and fatalities. According to Jumalil (2010), Philippine
maritime authorities reported an average of 183 incidents per year, from 1990-2002.
Meanwhile, the sinking of MV Doña Paz – I resulted in the loss of more than 4.000
precious lives, recording the worst peacetime maritime disaster in modern history.
(Perez et al., 2011)

Over the years, due to its litany of sea tragedies coupled with the public’s clamor and
the government’s awakening, the country’s maritime administration embarked on
many safety measures to prevent such undesirable occurrences. The Philippine
Government reorganized and restructured its maritime agencies including the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
Subsequently, PCG and MARINA formulated safety policies and enforcement
mechanisms to address the problems at hand. Nevertheless, Interferry (2019) noted
powerful pieces of evidence that the Philippines’ domestic ferry climate is changing
for the better. These preventive measures included the Philippine Coast Guard’s
(PCG) conduct of pre-departure inspection (PDI) on all domestic vessels, most
especially to domestic ferries. However, despite the many regulatory safety initiatives
such as PDI, maritime accidents, still, continue to happen.

1.2 Aims and Objectives
This research aims to investigate domestic ferry accidents and incidents in the
Philippines from 2008 up to 2020 based on official Maritime Accident and Incidents

16

Investigations (MAII) reported by the Philippine Coast Guard. Furthermore, the above
general aim is specifically elaborated through the following objectives:


To evaluate domestic ferry accidents in the country and consolidate
associated human and organizational factors;



To identify and scrutinize the role of PCG’s PDI regulations and enforcement
in accident prevention as a preventive measure;



To recognize interrelationships between PDI and Philippines domestic ferry
accidents; and



To propose solutions to enhance the country’s domestic ferry safety regulation
and enforcement.

1.2 Research Questions
The following specific questions help address the objectives of this study:


What are the human and organizational factors leading to domestic ferry
accidents in the Philippines?



What are the role and effectiveness of PDI regulations and enforcement in
accident prevention as a preventive safety measure?



How are PDI and Philippines domestic ferry accidents interrelated?



What safety recommendations can further enhance the country’s domestic
ferry safety and maritime safety enforcement activities including PDI?
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1.4 Hypothesis
The Philippines’ domestic ferry safety can be further enhanced by equipping its safety
inspectors with a centralized and computerized information system covering ship risk
profile, inspection, certification, deficiencies, detentions, and others. Furthermore, the
institutionalization of the safety inspector’s performance oversight is also crucial in the
said process. The above proposals are geared to establishing tight control over the
ferry industry and the regulators themselves.

1.5 Methodology
Twenty (20) maritime accidents and incidents were collated and processed using
HFACS and AcciMap accident causation models to identify and analyze the
Philippines’ ferry industry and the PDI regulatory and enforcement accident causal
factors and further provide appropriate recommendations for the country’s domestic
ferry safety enhancement.

1.6 Expected Outcomes
The compiled findings of this investigation should serve as comprehensive
information for the PCG as well as various stakeholders on contributory factors
associated with Philippine domestic ferry accidents, as a probable solution to enhance
domestic ferry safety in the country, as policy reference for improving the process of
maritime safety regulation and enforcement including PDI, and finally, as a
straightforward proposal for the implementation of future safety regulations to sustain
the country’s commitment to preventing maritime accidents and casualties.
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1.7 Key Assumptions and Limitations
This research assumes that the problem of the country’s domestic ferry safety is
partially rooted in the loosely controlled ferry industry and the lack of audit, monitoring,
and oversight mechanisms for the safety inspectors. In the conduct of this study, there
are some limitations to consider. First, the data set focuses only on domestic ferry
accidents with greater emphasis on passenger ships flying the Philippine flag.
Secondly, extracted accident reports revealed non-standardization demonstrated
through irregular reporting format utilized by the responsible agency. Due to the
irregularities, the researcher explored other avenues to clarify accident causal factors,
as well as to elaborate accident information of each incident. Thirdly, the availability
of accident reports, safety figures, and statistics was very limited. For this reason, out
of all accidents occurring between 2008 up to 2020, only a total of 20 accidents were
included.

1.8 Structure of the Study
To achieve the above aim, this paper follows the following order:

Chapter I introduces the topic of domestic ferry safety describes the problem being
tackled and discusses the main and secondary objectives of this dissertation.

Chapter II presents background information on domestic ferry safety enforcement and
regulations in the country, as well as discusses both domestic and foreign literature
and studies concerning the topic.
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Chapter III reserves the discussion of the methodology prescribed throughout the
dissertation, specifically on two accident causation models: HFACS and Accimap.

Chapter IV presents the HFACS-PDI data results and discussion about the
Philippines’ ferry industry human and organizational and the PDI regulations and
enforcement accident causal factors.

Chapter V illustrates the Accimap data results and discussion per accident and
incident type.

Chapter VI summarizes the findings, provides conclusions, and forwards appropriate
recommendations for various stakeholders.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This Literature Review summarizes and discusses the interrelation between an ideal
safe ferry model and ferry accident causal factors gathered from different studies and
sources of the world ferry industry to have a clear overview of its status, challenges,
and direction. Furthermore, this review, also, delves into the Philippine domestic ferry
industry

and

regulatory

organization,

functions,

enforcement

mechanisms,

challenges, improvements, and possible areas for advancements.

2.1 Safe Ferry Model
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognized the human element as
inseparable from the commission of maritime disasters especially for domestic ferries
(IMO, 2019). The current Strategic Plan compiled by IMO for the six years from 2018
to 2023, exclusively, focuses on the people involved in shipping. Regulatory bodies,
member states, shipping companies, seafarers, and the riding public all share the big
responsibility of promoting safety in all types of waterborne voyages, most especially
involving domestic ferries.

In one of the Expert Group Meetings held by the organization last March of 2020, the
report highlighted the significant development of a Ferry Safety framework by around
2022. Rahim (2020), the incumbent Secretariat of the IMO, realized that present
domestic ferry regulations do not seem to reduce accidents even with the best
intention and efforts. Since the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
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(SOLAS, 1974), every plan conceived to confront this international issue was mostly
repetitive. This problem is not specific to any country because most of the issue arises
due to human factors. The human element plays a huge role and many regulations
models ever since warranted its discussion.

In light of the above developments, this study, attempting to assess ferry safety issues
in the Philippine domestic ferry industry, require the discussion of a ferry safety model
as a baseline. In this case, the researcher decided to focus on the conceptualized
model by Dalziel & Weisbrod (2012). The authors attributed the safety of ferries to the
realization of five (5) key elements, as shown in Table 2-1. Each of the elements can
help investigations in singling out causal factors, directly and indirectly, contributing
to accidents in the domestic ferry shipping industry. The arrangement of the elements
in the definition of a safe ferry also bears a relatively huge impact on the outcome of
a voyage. On the other hand, the lack or absence of one of these key elements can
possibly lead to accidents.
Table 2-1 Safe Ferry Model (Dalziel & Weisbrod, 2012)
Safe Ferry Model
1. Ferry operator safety culture:
-ships suitable for intended service
-well-maintained ships
-properly operated, crewed ships
2. Regulatory regime:
-appropriate regulations & standards
-enforcement
3. Hazardous weather notification
4. Emergency response
-communication - alerting / location
-rescue / assistance resources
5. Knowledgeable passengers
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Table 1-2 Safe Ferry Model (Dalziel & Weisbrod, 2012) and Causes of Ferry
Accidents (IMO, 2019)
SAFE FERRY MODEL

1. Ferry operator safety culture:

-ships suitable for intended service

-well-maintained ships

-properly operated, crewed ships

2. Regulatory regime:
-appropriate regulations & standards
-enforcement

3. Hazardous weather notification

CAUSES OF FERRY ACCIDENTS
Lack of safety culture
Poor shore-side support
Pressure to sail
Domestic ferries unfit for purpose
Unsafe design
Impracticable conversions/ modification of
second-hand craft to domestic ferries
Stability issues, particularly lack
of damaged stability data
Shortage and/or unreachability/poor quality of
lifesaving equipment
Lack of communication (alerting/location)
Lack of crew competence
Lack of compliance
Fatigue
Poor bridge management
Ignorance of navigational warnings
Inadequate maintenance programmes
Inadequate guidance on handling of
emergencies
Poor
look out
Poor passenger management
Overloading/ overcrowding
Improper stowage of cargo
Improper carriage of dangerous goods
Complacency
Alleged/ apparent / actual corruption
Lack of enforcement
Unclear demarcation of responsibilities
Lack of all- encompassing/ overlapping/
scattered/absent legislation on domestic ferry
safety
Fatigue
Complacency
Alleged/ apparent/ actual corruption
Sailing in bad weather
Sudden hazardous weather

4. Emergency response
-communication (alerting / location)
-rescue / assistance resources

Inadequate rescue response
Undeclared mass on board
Complacency
Alleged/ apparent/ actual corruption
Pressure to sail
Inadequate provision and inadequate
maintenance of aids to navigation

5. Knowledgeable passengers

Aids to Navigation (ATON)
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Table 2-2 reveals the five elements of the safe ferry model by Dalziel & Weisbrod
(2012) relative to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) domestic ferry nonexhaustive list of causal factors IMO (2019). Almost all identified causes fitted to the
safe ferry model except for the inadequate provision and inadequate maintenance of
aids to navigation which can fall to another key category which is Aids to Navigation.

Nonetheless, ferry operator safety culture gets the highest number of causes totaling
twenty-nine (29) causes. It is secondly followed by the regulatory regime with eleven
(11) causes. The remaining three (3) elements get two (2), one (1), and seven (7)
causes, respectively. Based on the identified number of causes, the authors were
indirectly suggesting that the operator’s implementation of safety regulations enforced
and mandated by the corresponding regulatory regime play a significant role in
accidents.

Furthermore, Lloyd’s Register Foundation’s (2018) nine (9) proposed fatality
causes are, likewise, fitted to the Dalziel & Weisbrod (2012) Safe Ferry model (See
Table 2-3). Eight (8) out of nine (9) causal factors matched the safe ferry model.
Meanwhile, the human/social issues are not found in the model but are an additional
element to the broad domestic ferry safety causal factors.
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Table 2-2 Safe Ferry Model (Dalziel & Weisbrod, 2012) and Accident Causal Factors
(Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2018)
Lloyd’s Register Foundation
Accident Causal Factors
Unseaworthy / vessel design
Safety equipment
Competence/ training
Poor seamanship
Overcrowding

Safe Ferry Model
1. Ferry operator safety culture:
-ships suitable for intended service
-well-maintained ships
-properly operated, crewed ships
2. Regulatory regime:
-appropriate regulations & standards
-enforcement
3. Hazardous weather notification
4. Emergency response
-communication - alerting / location
-rescue / assistance
Resources
5. Knowledgeable passengers

Regulatory
Weather
Inadequate search and rescue

Human/ social issues

Comparably, Lloyd’s Register Foundation (2018) suggested the same. Noncommitting to regulation and safety culture, together with suboptimal vessel design,
technology, and safety equipment, connive to create a perfect storm for domestic
ferries. Table 2-4 showed how these elements were confirmed by various safety
expert entities. The nine (9) attributed causes highlight the influence of the five (5)
elements as pursued by Dalziel & Weisbrod (2012) and by many others. Although
some experts disagree on the significance of a relationship between regulation and
ferry fatalities, Lloyd’s Register believed inadequate regulations or failure to enforce
existing regulations, when it particularly leads to vessel unseaworthiness, play a huge
role in ferry fatalities.
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Table 2-4 Fatality causes as proposed by contributors (Lloyd’s Register
Foundation,2018)

Additionally, the safe ferry model’s five (5) elements are non-exhaustive list. Port
facilities, aids to navigation, classification societies, insurers, accident investigations
and others can also contribute to a very ideal and safe domestic ferries.

2.2 Marine Casualty Investigation
Accidents in the ferry sector, like in other industries, can be minimized but still occur
despite extensive mitigating efforts. Nevertheless, these accidents through proper
investigations can be a source of very valuable information of determining the
accident root causes and other surrounding factors to be used in preventing future
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accidents. Thus, Lawson and Weisbrod, (2005) included investigation as one of the
functions in its Post Event Responsibilities, as shown in Table 2-5.

Furthermore, IMO (2019) states that “every marine casualty or incident of navigation
on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury
to nationals of another State, serious damage to ships or installations of another State,
or serious damage to the marine environment shall be investigated by or before a
suitably qualified person or persons. The flag State and the other State will cooperate
in the investigation of any such marine casualty or navigational mishap conducted by
the other State.”

Moreover, “each Administration is required by International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulation I/21 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) articles 8 and 12 to conduct an
investigation into any casualty involving ships under its flag that are subject to those
conventions, and to provide the Organization with pertinent information regarding the
findings of such investigations. The examination of casualties is also required by
Article 23 of the Load Lines Convention. State and the other State will cooperate in
any investigation conducted by the other State into any such maritime casualty or
navigational mishap” (IMO ,2019). Thus, Marine Casualty Investigation (MCI) Reports
value in future accident prevention is, likewise, of utmost importance.
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Table 2-5. Post Even Responsibilities for Ferry Safety in Developing Countries
(Lawson and Weisbrod, 2005)

2.3 Philippines Domestic Ferry Industry
According to Badajos (1999), there is a demand for a specific activity, as in every
market economy (maritime transport, in this case). This demand gives rise to the
development of a shipping firm due to its apparent profitability. The company's
formation necessitates the purchase of vessels as well as the hiring of seafarers to
run the vessels. The government enters the framework to protect the interests of both
the public (who required the activity) and the private sector (who is willing to supply
for the activity) because there are two sectors engaged. (See Figure 2-1)
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Figure 2-1. Framework of Maritime Transport (Badajos,1999)

The shipping industry is regulated by the Philippine government through the then
Ministry of Transportation and Communications, which is now a responsibility of the
Department of Transportation (DOTr) (See Figure 2-2). When the Philippines became
a member of the International Maritime Organization back in 1964, subject to
international laws and provisions like the International Labor Organization (ILO) and
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), the country formed the
Philippine Maritime Administration which consists of all government agencies having
primary and supporting responsibilities in implementing mandatory international
instruments.
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Figure 2-2 Maritime related organizational structure

DOTr’s “attached agencies are the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) which is
mandated to integrate the development, promotion, and regulation of the country’s
maritime industry; the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is responsible for the promotion
of safety of life and property at sea, safeguard the marine environment and resources
and enforce all applicable maritime laws; and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
whose responsibility as a developer, operator, maintainer and regulator of all the ports
under its jurisdiction” (Dimailig et al., 2011).

As shown in Table 2-6, the Philippines' domestic fleet is composed of 29,974
registered domestic ships/boats in the country. Passenger ships, fishing boats, and
other types of boats have 11,898, 12,989, and 5,087 counts, respectively. The
domestic ferries are further divided into 773 big ferry vessels and 11,125 small ferry
boats (MARINA, 2020).
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Table 2-6 Number of Domestic Ferries (MARINA ,2020)

Moreover, Figure 2-3 shows the different domestic shipping routes of the country.
Shipping routes are classified as primary, secondary and tertiary routes.
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Figure 2-3. Domestic Shipping Routes (Dimailig et al., 2011)

In addition, Table 2-7 is the Summary of Port Statistics of the PPA in 2020. The below
record shows the dependence of the country on sea transport in the movement of
people and goods.
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Table 2-7. Summary of Port Statistics in 2020 (PPA ,2020)

2.3.1. Maritime Industry Authority
The Maritime Industry Authority was established in June 1974 to enforce any quasijudicial function about water transportation. On January 30, 1987, EO No. 125
(amended in the same year by EO 125-A) reorganized the Department of
Transportation and Communications which further enhanced the responsibility of
MARINA to the country’s maritime sector. That same year the Doña Paz accident
happened. Pimentel (2019) of Manila Times stated that MARINA could not have
averted the disaster simply because the eight-month period before the tragedy may
not be enough. She cited the frequent opposition to MARINA’s assuming the mandate
which further stalled the implementation of the Executive Order. Despite the tragedy
testing MARINA’s integrity, the agency was able to consistently perform its mandate
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presiding over the Philippine shipping industry as well as in the area of domestic ferry
safety. According to Baird’s (2018) review of the country’s safety record, it was not
until the 2012 increased coordination of MARINA’s functions that MARINA’s
competitiveness was assured. The author cited the strategic plan “Philippines:
Transport Sector Assessment, Strategy and Road Map in 2012” as the most influential
in terms of gearing the Philippines toward greater safety awareness.

2.3.2. Philippine Coast Guard
As a coastal and port state, the Philippine Coast Guard protects the country,
performing both armed and civilian services for its coastlines and ports. The agency
was part of the military before its transfer from the Department of National Defense,
to the Office of the President, and eventually to the Department of Transportation and
Communications on April 15, 1998, through Executive Order 475 and 477, signed by
President Fidel Ramos. The conversion has led to the organization being offered
various assistance from other countries such as vessels, equipment, technology,
services, and cooperation.

The Coast Guard Law of 2009, through Republic Act 9993, further strengthened the
agency’s role in nation-building. The law helped strengthen its authority over any
shipping fleet, gearing itself as the forefront fishnet to ensure maritime safety in
territorial waters. Today, PCG projects included the following: establishing radar sites
(such as the proposed ZamBaSulTa or Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi
triangle), issuing navigational warnings such as the NAVTEX warnings in partnership
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with PAGASA, improving Search and Rescue (SAR) services, performing Vessel
Traffic Services (VTS), monitoring environmental pollution in the waters, and, as the
lighthouse authority, sustaining aids to navigation (AtoN) across all coastlines.

The projects entered into by the Philippine Coast Guard demonstrate the many
responsibilities it currently subsumes. The agency serves as the policing and
enforcing arm in the maritime transport industry. As such, the Philippine government
recognized the more comprehensive role of the PCG. Thus, all memorandums were
consolidated and integrated under the Republic Act (R.A.) 9993, known as the Coast
Guard Law of 2009.

Based on the Coast Guard Law of 2009, the PCG (2012) released Memorandum
Circular 07-2012 coinciding with the strategic plan conceived by the Philippine
Government. This pre-departure inspection policy references the DOTC (2012)
Department Order 2012-01 entitled “Mandating the Strict Implementation of
Precautionary, Safety and Security Measures to Ensure Safe, Fast, Efficient and
Reliable Transportation Services, the Immediate Implementation of Quick Response
Protocols, and the Immediate Investigation of Transformation-Related Incidents”. The
pre-departure inspection function was based on a prior memorandum circular
released by the PCG in 1998 known as MC 04-98 or the Mandatory Pre-Departure
Inspection.
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The Coast Guard Law of 2009 calls the PCG to conduct “pre-departure inspection of
all merchant's vessels calling at domestic ports to promote their continuing
compliance with safety standards prescribed by the existing policies, rules, and
regulations, marine pollution prevention, standards on manning and competency of
seafarers.” Any shipmaster and shipowner/company failing to comply with safety
requirements will be penalized after due notice and investigation. The memorandum
consists of a total of thirteen (13) policies under three (3) general provisions.

Furthermore, based from R.A. 9993’s Rule 3 (j) PCG is likewise tasked “to investigate
and inquire into the causes of all maritime accidents involving death, casualties and
damage to properties” (Congress of the Philippines, 2010) .

2.4. Philippine domestic ferry accidents
Meanwhile, according to the PCG (2018), every few years, the country is hit by a wave
of maritime incidents, the most of which can be traced back to three main causes: 1)
Ship management (vessel maintenance, crew competency); 2) government
regulatory enforcement (MARINA & PCG); and 3) the general public. Furthermore, as
an archipelago, the Philippines necessitates a well-functioning water transportation
system. However, this is not the case right now.

The domestic shipping business is known for its high pricing, poor service quality, and
poor safety record (The World Bank and IFC, 2014). Also, Zen and Anandhika (2016)
noted poor congestion management, high stevedoring rates, inefficient handling
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equipment, regulatory burden through extensive red tapes, fragmented port
operations and non-sterile ports contribute to the inefficiency of the archipelagic state.
Also, despite being the leading source of seafarers globally, the country may not be
able to offer more as estimates of officer shortages may increase after 2020
(MARINA, 2020). When taken together, the Philippine Coast Guard may not be able
to properly engage in proactive prevention, much more on reactive measures to
mitigate accident fatalities within the expansive coasts and seas of the archipelago.

As shown in Table 2-8 is the list of disasters involving passenger ships in Philippine
waters (Dimailig et al., 2011). Four notable accidents were recorded as the most
famous. This included the collision of M/V Cebu City and Kota Suria in Manila Bay
with 140 fatalities; the collision of M/V Doña Paz and the oil tanker MT Vector with
1,800 fatalities; the sinking of Doña Paz’s sister ship M/V Doña Marilyn with 250
fatalities; and the capsizing of M/V Princess of the Stars with 800 fatalities (Dimailig
et al., 2011).

Table 2-8 List of Maritime Accidents in the Philippines from 1987-2010 (Dimailig et
al., 2011)
VESSEL / DATE

NATURE OF ACCIDENT

Doña Paz (1987)

Collided/Sunk with M/T Vector. 1,800 died,
but 4,341 persons were allegedly killed.

Dona Marilyn (1988).

Ferry sunk, more than 250 dead.

Cebu City (1994).

Collided with a cargo ship, about 140 dead.

Princess of the Orient (1998)

Ferry sank in typhoon. About 150 died.
Survivor waited for 12H to be rescued.
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Annahanda (2000)

Overloaded/Sunk. About 100 people died.

Superferry-12 (2003)

Collision with MV San Nicholas. 43 dead and
21 missing.

Superferry-14 (2004)

Bombed/Terrorism, 116 dead.

Solar I (2006)

Sunk in bad weather. 190,000 liters of oil
spilled.
Sunk in typhoon. 700-800 passengers and
about 30 crews died/missing.
Small wooden-hulled ferry sunk in freak
winds leaving 42 dead.

Princess of the Stars (2008)
Don Dexter (2008)
Maejan (2008)

Ferry capsized, leaving 30 dead.

Commander-6 (2009)

Wooden-hulled motorized banca had cracked
open and sunk, leaving 12 dead.

Superferry-9 (2009)

Tilted sharply and sunk. 9 killed

Catalyn B (2009)

Wooden-hulled motorized banca collided with
Fishing boat. 4 died, 23 still missing.
Ferry sunk due flooding. 3 died and at least
22 others were still missing.
Barge aground during the typhoon, part of its
coal cargo lost overboard.

Baleno-9 (2009)
Gold Trans 306 (2010)
West Ocean 1 (2010)

Caught fire following an explosion on board.

So far, the country ranked second next to Bangladesh in the list of a total number of
known fatal ferry accidents as compiled by Baird (2018) from 1966 to 2015. Baird
believed the total number of recorded incidents comprised only about 66% of the
actual total. Many accidents before the 2000 reporting may have been unreported,
unknown, or un-recorded. As per recorded fatalities, the Philippines ranked first with
10,370 next to Bangladesh’s 9,820. Baird (2018) noted this to be the case due to the
majority of passenger vessels registered in the country are motor bancas. National
media may not actually care for those with few casualties while the PCG has limits
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overseeing all possible accidents. In fact, major tourist guides warn foreigners and
travelers against taking ferries to enjoy the Philippines’ majestic sceneries because
of the high accident potential of motor bancas and small wooden-hulled ferries.

Still, many experts lauded the Philippines’ breakthrough in the decrease in ferry
accidents and fatalities after previous catastrophic disasters. Baird (2018) declared
that the regulatory regimes of the country can more than adequately conceive
strategies and plans which directly impact safe inter-island travels. The more open
environment fueled mostly by the free press consequently became part of the solution.
This considerable decrease can be attributed to the numerous safety policies
formulated and implemented by the government. Several key safety improvements
can be attributed to the collective efforts made by the MARINA and PCG as two main
governing bodies enforcing these developments.

However, the 2.5 accidents and 35 fatalities per year in the ferry industry remains to
be a huge challenge. In this regard, the MARINA and PCG need to continuously step
up their efforts to promote domestic ferry safety. Thus, this study is being conducted.

2.5. Philippines domestic ferry safety challenges and improvements
So far, the country ranked second next to Bangladesh in the list of a total number of
known fatal ferry accidents as compiled by Baird (2018) from 1966 to 2015. Baird
believed the total number of recorded incidents comprised only about 66% of the
actual total. Many accidents before the 2000 reporting may have been unreported,

39

unknown, or un-recorded. As per recorded fatalities, the Philippines ranked first with
10,370 next to Bangladesh’s 9,820. Baird (2018) noted this to be the case due to the
majority of passenger vessels registered in the country are motor bancas. National
media may not actually care for those with few casualties while the PCG has limits
overseeing all possible accidents. In fact, major tourist guides warn foreigners and
travelers against taking ferries to enjoy the Philippines’ majestic sceneries because
of the high accident potential of motor bancas and small wooden-hulled ferries.

Still, many experts lauded the Philippines’ breakthrough in the decrease in ferry
accidents and fatalities after previous catastrophic disasters. Baird (2018) declared
that the regulatory regimes of the country can more than adequately conceive
strategies and plans which directly impact safe inter-island travels. The more open
environment fueled mostly by the free press consequently became part of the solution.
This considerable decrease can be attributed to the numerous safety policies
formulated and implemented by the government. Several key safety improvements
can be attributed to the collective efforts made by the MARINA and PCG as two main
governing bodies enforcing these developments.

However, the 2.5 accidents and 35 fatalities per year in the ferry industry remains to
be a huge challenge. In this regard, the MARINA and PCG need to continuously step
up their efforts to promote domestic ferry safety. Thus, this study is being conducted.
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Figure 2-4 Problem Tree Analysis (PTA) of Maritime Industry (MARINA,2018)

According to MARINA (2018), the poor quality of the sea transport system is attributed
to the following five factors:
• Aging ships mostly imported secondhand from other countries, which pose a
high risk to human life at sea due to the conversion of some old cargo ships to
passenger ships;
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• Inadequacy of ports and port facilities, with the poor condition of some ports
attributed to the type of management arrangement;
• Shortage of qualified officers and crew for both domestic shipping and fishing
enterprises;
• Inaccessibility of affordable financing and lack of attractive incentive packages,
particularly for small- and medium-sized domestic shipping companies; and
• Weak regulation and supervision of shipping, fishing, and other maritimerelated enterprises and activities including law enforcement

Apart from the comprehensive review by Baird (2018), a recent study by Dimailig, Kim
& Rim (2017) noticed that underreporting of incidents is outright prevalent in the
Philippines. The authors attributed the cause to the incapacity of the Philippine Coast
Guard to monitor all coastlines of the archipelago. They declared that this inability is
due to procedural lapses and lack of equipment. They believed the government must
re-study and revise the functions of the different maritime agencies (PCG, MARINA,
PPA, etc.) and to revolutionize the safety monitoring system of the country through
procurements, installations, and upgrades.

Another study points in the same direction. Kim & Baek (2019) investigating the
country’s coastal shipping policy cited the necessity of re-assessing law and
institutional systems and government support, and improving IT systems, navigation
safety systems, and infrastructures.
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Hernandez (2019) proposed the creation of an archipelagic state by establishing
archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) in the Philippines. In his master’s thesis, he suggested
that the government must negotiate with the International Maritime Organization
Maritime Safety Committee (IMO-MSC) in enacting these lanes which, according to
the author, can strengthen the monitoring and surveillance capabilities of the PCG.
Strengthening the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) and providing more
seaborne patrol assets are also priorities if the country wishes to strengthen maritime
security and protection of marine resources.

Highlighting the importance of the regulatory regime is one of the recommendations
for preventing accidents in the maritime zone. Based on the safe ferry model by
Dalziel & Weisbrod (2012), the enforcement of regulations and legislations highly
substantiate already weakened systems in ships, among ferry operators and crew
members, which unsurprisingly lead to accidents, loss of lives and properties. It is
therefore in the hands of MARINA as the brain and PCG as the body to properly
enforce its regulations. One such important mechanism believed by the researcher to
promote a culture of safety is to improve PDI. A ship considered unseaworthy,
manned by underqualified personnel and crewmen can be prevented to sail therefore
preventing human errors and judgment when they ply the dangerous waters of the
archipelago. Strengthening the system by any means possible can and will prevent
accidents and fatalities in the future.
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One officer from the PCG even requested that the system altogether be transferred
from the government in the contention that the current regime is incapacitated to fulfill
such a hugely impactful responsibility (Tarriela, 2019). Golden & Weisbrod (2016)
argued that common accident factors like human error, sailing in hazardous weather,
and overcrowding already have solutions. The problem is how to make those solutions
(mostly technological and technical in nature) available to ferry operators and
passengers.

Apart from all the conventional and non-conventional recommendations, the key
takeaway is that the Philippine Coast Guard needed to continue modernization. The
only way to achieve this is for the agency to be supported by various stakeholders
involved under the amalgamated Philippine Maritime Administration. This could be
realized through the additional support of various organizations like the IMO,
Interferry, more developed neighbor nations, classification societies, international
development banks, and even NGOs seeking to help the poor rise out of poverty.
Baird (2018) sees the country on the right path towards rapid improvement because,
as a democratic country, the case is already analyzed, discussed, and presented; the
only right thing to do now is for the government to act on it. For researchers, the
assessment of accidents and the contributory factors may help distinguish pertinent
issues that may need patching in the meantime. This study revolves around urgently
informing stakeholders and giving them practical recommendations to improve and fix
appropriate systems. The goal is to maximize the potential of state resources toward
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preventing future maritime accidents and fatalities in allegedly ‘dangerous’ Philippine
waters.

2.6. Insights
Domestic ferry safety, as a topic, is very broad in scope. From the five (5) elements
of a safe ferry model, other elements such as port facilities, aids to navigation,
classification societies, overcrowding, overloading, and human/ social issues,
investigation, documentation of accidents, sanctions, insurances, and victim support,
also play a significant role to the overall ferry safety. Nevertheless, out of the five (5)
key elements of the safe ferry model, the ferry operator safety culture is the most
crucial having the highest number of accident causes. Moreover, human error, which
is directly under the ferry operator safety culture element, remains to be the highest
contributor to accidents. Consequently, the safety regulations and their stringent
enforcement are devised to serve as an additional line of defense to preclude such
tragic accidents. Similarly, these enforcement activities, aside from preventing
accidents, also educate the riding public and the ferry industry about safety thereby
increasing their individual levels of safety awareness which is the best way to achieve
the goal of minimizing accidents and fatalities.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
This part discusses the HFACS and Accimap accident causation models. It describes
the origins of the framework and relays important points to demonstrate the
usefulness of the different elements for this study. Likewise, HFACS-MSS adaptation
and modification into HFACS-PDI is also explained and elaborated. Their subsequent
usage among scholars and researchers in the field of maritime accident investigation
is also enumerated.

3.1 The HFACS Model
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was created in the
United States Navy to improve human performance in complex systems. HFACS can
be described as a reductionist, linear accident causation model as a complex model.
“Accident causation models (ACM) enable to identify the contributing variables of the
accident, analyze their cause links, and, subsequently, design solutions for accident
prevention and mitigation,” according to Dhalmahapatra, K., Das, S., & Maiti, J.
(2020). Accidents are induced by mutually interacting factors in real-time contexts,
according to complex non-linear models (Hollnagel, 2010). Understanding these
various interacting elements, according to the HFACS model, can help prevent
accidents.

HFACS was based on the Swiss cheese model developed by James T. Reason.
Human systems were described as slices of cheese of the Swiss variety which has
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holes in it. According to its proponent, each slice or layer signifies a layer of defense
against the risk of threat where each successive layer prevents any accident to
materialize. In order to prevent a single point of failure, the holes or identified
weaknesses must not align with other weak spots in the defenses. When it aligns in
a straight, cumulative act, a catastrophic failure ultimately occurs. From the model
displayed in Figure 3-1, there are four layers of protection before an accident can
occur. It also displayed the top-down connection of human, organizational and
technological elements.

Figure 3-1 Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (HFACS, Inc | The HFACS Framework,
2014)
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The model further expounds on active and latent failures where the active failure is
attributed to immediate causes of an accident while the latent failure is attributed to
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions.

Drs. Wiegmann and Shappell used the Swiss Cheese Model to develop the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)(See Figure 2). The authors
used the same four systems and outlined several indicators under each system. The
framework allows accident investigators to directly pinpoint active failures and
generate organizational and technological factors out of the different levels of inquiry.
It can be used to analyze past failures and identify trends on the root causes of unsafe
behaviors while revealing latent conditions inside the organization allowing these to
happen. When causes are better determined, the organization can now engage in
preventive measures to mitigate these hazards, which then can help improve human
performance and lower accidents and fatalities for the industry.

The use of HFACS in the navy was profoundly beneficial for the organization. Many
other industries utilized the simplistic approach of HFACS in their accident
investigations. Its modification allowed for a more targeted approach to different
organizational constructs and many studies decided to do just that.

Additionally, some notable researches regarding maritime accidents which utilized the
HFACS model includes Human Factor Analysis Classification System - Passenger
Vessel (HFACS-PV) (Uğurlu et al., 2018); Human Factor Analysis Classification
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System - Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACS-MSS) (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011);
Marine Human Factor Analysis Classification System Framework (Kang, 2017); and
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - Maritime Accidents (HFACSMA) Model (Wang et al., 2020).

Figure 3-2 Wiegmann and Shappell’s Adoption of the Swiss Cheese Model for the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (HFACS, Inc | The
HFACS Framework, 2014).
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3.2 The HFACS-Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACS-MSS)
For this paper, several accident causation models have been considered but the
author decided to pattern this research from HFACS-MSS model. The improved
HFACS-MSS is illustrated in Table 3-1 as adapted by Schroder-Hinrichs et al (2011).
With this model, as highlighted below, outside factors were added to the HFACS as a
fifth level above organizational influences, with the goal of focusing on the impact of
shipping safety laws and their enforcement. (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011 as cited
in Onsongo, 2017).

Table 3-1 HFACS-MSS Framework (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011).
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3.3 The HFACS-Pre-Departure Inspection (HFACS-PDI)
From the HFACS-MSS ((Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011), the author made some minor
changes to it and modified it into HFACS- Pre-departure inspection (HFACS-PDI) to
specifically focus on PDI important elements which include the PDI and other related
regulations and PDI enforcement related issues, as shown in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2 HFACS-PDI 2nd and 3RD Tier Factors
PDI and other related
regulations
Outside
Factors

Rules and
Regulations
Absence of PDI

Statutory
PDI enforcement related
issues

PDI Error
PDI Violation

The PDI and other related regulations simply pertain to the rules and regulations
surrounding PDI. Meanwhile, PDI enforcement-related issues are divided into three
sub-categories namely: absence of PDI, PDI Error, and PDI violation. Furthermore,
Table 3-3 below describes each PDI factor.

Table 3-3 HFACS-PDI Factors Description
PDI Factors
Rules and regulations
Absence of PDI

PDI error

PDI violation

Description
Factors in the PDI enforcement when related regulations
are absent or not updated leading to unsafe situation.
Factors in the PDI enforcement when the safety
inspector fails to perform PDI leading to unsafe situation.
Factors in the PDI enforcement when the safety
inspectors failed to achieve their goal as a result of
perceptual, skill-based, or judgement and decision
making errors which can lead to unsafe situation.
Factors in the PDI enforcement when the actions of the
safety inspector represent willful disregard for regulations
which can lead to unsafe situation.
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Finally, the author adopts and utilizes the HFACS-PDI in this paper to achieve its
objectives, as shown in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4 HFACS-PDI
1st Tier
Outside Factors
(Statutory)

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

PDI and other related
regulations
PDI enforcement related
issues
Resource Management

Organizational
Influences

Organizational Climate

Organizational Process

Inadequate supervision
Unsafe
supervision

Planned inappropriate
operations
Failed to correct known
problems
Supervisory violations
Environmental factors

Preconditions for
unsafe acts

Crew condition
Personnel Factors



Rules and regulations















Absence of PDI
PDI Error
PDI violation
Human resources
Technological resources
Equipment/Facility
Structure
resources
Policies
Culture
Structure
Policies
Culture
Shipborne and shore
supervision



Shipborne operations



Shipborne related
shortcomings
Shipborne violations
Physical environment
Technological
environment
Cognitive
factors
Physiological state
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors










Errors



Violations





Unsafe Acts

52

Decisions and
judgement errors
Perceptual errors
Routine violations
Exceptional

3.4 The AcciMap Model
In addition, Accimap is a graphical representation model that incorporates linked
socio-technical variables into an integrated framework, according to Lee et al. (2017).
Accimaps typically examine failures at six levels of analysis: government policy and
budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local government planning and
budgeting

(including

company

management,

technical,

and

operational

management); physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and
surroundings (Waterson et al., 2016).

AcciMap depicts the context in which an accident occurred as well as the relationships
between multiple layers of the investigated system that led to that occurrence. In
general, the patterns of dangers within an industrial sector can be defined by
analysing prior accidents within the provided framework. This type of study can lead
to the creation of safe-operations preconditions, which is a major goal of proactive
risk management systems.

Salmon et al. (2012) argued that the systems-based accident analysis method
Accimap was based off Rasmussen’s risk management framework. The framework
shows how actors at various system levels contribute to production and safety
management. All hazards are being controlled at each level and transferred down to
the bottom levels. Rasmussen, through his 1997 work on risk management, proposed
that same year the Accimap method which will be influential in the coming decades
in representing system wide failures which lead to accidents, loss of property and
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fatalities. Figure 3-3 shows Accimap and the different system levels as conceptualized
by Rasmussen.

In addition, Accimap is a graphical representation model that incorporates linked
socio-technical variables into an integrated framework, according to Lee et al. (2017).
Accimaps typically examine failures at six levels of analysis: government policy and
budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local government planning and
budgeting

(including

company

management,

technical,

and

operational

management); physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and
surroundings (Waterson et al., 2016).

AcciMap depicts the context in which an accident occurred as well as the relationships
between multiple layers of the investigated system that led to that occurrence. In
general, the patterns of dangers within an industrial sector can be defined by
analyzing prior accidents within the provided framework. This type of study can lead
to the creation of safe-operations preconditions, which is a major goal of proactive
risk management systems.

Salmon et al. (2012) argued that the systems-based accident analysis method
Accimap was based on Rasmussen’s risk management framework. The framework
shows how actors at various system levels contribute to production and safety
management. All hazards are being controlled at each level and transferred down to
the bottom levels. Rasmussen, through his 1997 work on risk management, proposed
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that same year the Accimap method which will be influential in the coming decades
in representing system-wide failures that lead to accidents, loss of property, and
fatalities. Figure 3-3 shows Accimap and the different system levels as conceptualized
by Rasmussen.

Figure 3-3 Rasmussen’s Accimap Method (Salmon et al., 2012)

Also, important studies regarding maritime accidents which used Accimap Model
includes the Sewol ferry tragedy in South Korea (Lee et al., 2017) and the capsizing
of China's Eastern Star in 2015, and Korea's Sewol ferry in 2014 (Jiang, 2016)
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Chapter 4
HFACS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the HFACS results (accident causal factors) using the twenty (20)
PCG accident and incident investigation reports from 2008-2020 will be presented.
Subsequently, all accident causal factors as per HFACS level will be individually laid
down and fitted with the Safe ferry model elements, as applicable, to logically and
thoroughly discuss them. Furthermore, the identified Philippines’ domestic ferry
industry inside accident causal factors and the PDI outside factors interrelationships
will, also, be tackled.

4.1 Ferry Accidents and Incidents in the Philippines
This research utilized and analyzed twenty (20) official domestic ferry accidents and
incidents in the Philippines (See Table 4-1). A more detailed information and accident
summary can be found in Appendix A. The said investigation reports were all
conducted by the PCG, while, three (3) accidents were jointly performed by the PCG
with the MARINA. Also, out of the 20 maritime accident and incident investigation
reports, six (6) were performed by the BMI and SBMI, while, the thirteen (14) were
conducted by the MCIS and other Coast Guard Districts and Stations MCI Teams.
The twenty (20) accidents and incidents were broken down into capsizing/
submerging, ramming/collision/allision, sinking, fire, and alleged overcrowding.
Additionally, one (1) incident was initially involved in a collision which later on resulted
in its sinking. The said investigation reports were requested from the Office of the MCI
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Service and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Maritime Safety Services of the
PCG.

Table 4-1 Summary of uncoded Ferry Accidents and Incidents in the Philippines
Selected Ferry Accidents and Incidents in the Philippines
No

Date

Vessel Name

Area

1

Jun-08

MV Princess Of
The Star
MBCA Don
Dexter

Sibuyan,
Romblon
Dimasalang
Masbate

2

Nov-08

3

Dec-09

MV Baleno 9

Verde Island
Batangas

4

Jan-10

MV Cotabato
Princess

5

Aug-13

MV Thomas
Aquinas

6

Sep-14

MV Maharlika Ii

7

Jul-15

8

Nature of
Incident

Severity

Remarks

Very
Serious
Very
Serious

Death-42
Missing-10

Sinking

Very
Serious

Death-6
Missing-44

Iloilo
Arrastre Pier

Ramming/
Collision

Less
Serious

Death-0

Cebu
Channel
Southern
Leyte

Collision/
Sinking

Death-55
Missing-65

MBCA Kim
Nirvana B

Ormoc Port

Capsizing

Very
Serious
Very
Serious
Very
Serious

Dec-16

MV Starlite
Atlantic 2

Maricaban
Island
Batangas

Sinking

Very
Serious

Death-1
Missing-18

9

Jan-17

LCT Poseidon
26

Allen Samar

Allision/
Collision

Serious

Death-0
Hull
Damage

10

Jun-17

MBCA Alad
Express 2

Romblon

Capsizing

Very
Serious

Death-5

11

Sep-17

MV Ma Matilde

Tablas
Rombon

Ramming/
Collision

Serious

Injured-51

12

Sep-17

MV Ocean Jet
12

Batangas
Port

Ramming /
Collision

Serious

Injured -6
W/ Vessel
Damage

13

Dec-17

Mv Mercraft3

Sinking

Very
Serious

Death-4

14

Apr-18

MV Virgin De
Penafrancia Vii

OverCrowding

Less
Serious

Death-0

15

Aug-19

MV Lite Ferry
16

16

Aug-19

MBCA Chichi

17

Aug-19

MBCA Keziah

Infanta
Quezon
Port Of
Banton,
Romblon
Dapitan City
Guimaras
Strait
Guimaras
Strait
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Capsizing
Capsizing

Sinking

Fire
Capsizing
Capsizing

Very
Serious
Very
Serious
Very
Serious

Death-814

Death-2
Death-62

Death-4
Missing-39
Death-31

18

Aug-19

MBCA Jenny
Vince

19

Dec-19

MV Island Roro

20

Nov-20

MBCA Gesu
De Bambino

Guimaras
Strait
Camotes
Port
Atimonan
Quezon

Capsizing

Very
Serious

Capsizing

Serious

Death-0

Submerging/
Capsizing

Very
Serious

Death-1

The above table also indicated the nature of accidents and incidents included sinking,
capsizing, ramming, collision, submerging, fire and alleged overcrowding.
Furthermore, said accidents resulted to 1,026 deaths and 176 missing persons.

In addition, as per IMO (2008), MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3 gave the guidance on the
categorization of maritime accidents. The three (3) accident categorization are as
follows:


Very serious casualties are casualties to ships which involve total
loss of the ship, loss of life, or severe pollution.



Serious casualties are casualties to ships which do not qualify as
very serious casualties and which involve a fire, explosion, collision,
grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice damage, hull
cracking, or suspected hull defect, etc., resulting in:
1. immobilization of main engines, extensive accommodation
damage, severe structural damage, such as penetration of the
hull under water, etc., rendering the ship unfit to proceed,
2. pollution (regardless of quantity); and/or
3. a breakdown necessitating towage or shore assistance.
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Less serious casualties are casualties to ships which do not qualify
as very serious casualties or serious casualties and for the purpose
of recording useful information also include marine incidents which
themselves includes hazardous incidents and near misses.

The accident severity category showed fourteen (14), four (4) and two (2) incidents
were very serious, serious and less serious, respectively.(See Table 4-2) Likewise,
half of the ferries age at the time of accidents were twenty (20) years old and below.
Meanwhile, the other half were above twenty (20) years old. The oldest ferry was
forty-seven (47) years old. Moreover, out of the twenty (20) ferries, five (5) sunk, eight
(8) capsized, (1) submerged, four (4) rammed, one (1) caught fire and one (1) was
alleged to be overcrowded.

Table 4-2 Accident Category, Ship’s Age and Nature of Incident
ACCIDENT
CATEGORY
Very serious
Serious
Less serious

TOTAL

NO.
14
4
2

SHIP’S
AGE
1-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50

20

NO.
6
4
3
3
4
20

NATURE OF
INCIDENT
Capsizing/Submerging
Ramming
Sinking
Fire
Alleged Overcrowding

NO.
8/1
4
5
1
1
20

4.2 HFACS Results
After collecting and consolidating the twenty (20) maritime accidents and incidents
investigation reports, they were

processed one by one using HFACS Accident

Causation Model. In the HFACS coding process, all causal factors per accident or
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incident were classified into the 5 different levels of the HFACS Model namely: unsafe
acts, precondition to unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational influences and
outside factors.

Levels 1 to 4 of HFACS Model was adopted in this study except of the outside factors
where the author made some changes and gave emphasis on the Pre-departure
Inspection regulations and enforcement which is mandatory prior sailing and also,
part of all maritime accident and incident investigation reports.

The HFACS coding process of the twenty (20) maritime accident and incident
investigation reports resulted into the identification of two hundred twelve (212) 3rd tier
causal factors (See Table 4-3). The detailed HFACS Coding results of the 3rd tier
accident causal factors can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4-3 Overview about 212 identified 3rd Tier HFACS Causal Factors in the
investigation reports reviewed
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines’ Ferry Industry Human and Organizational and
PDI Regulation and Enforcement Factors
Outside Factors (PDI)
PDIR
PDI and Other Related Regulations
XXX
PDIR 000 Rules and Regulations
PDIE
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
XXX
PDIE 000 Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200 PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
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Figures
No

%

22

10

1

0.5

1
2
18
47

0.5
1
8
22

2
0
5

1
0
2

OC XXX

Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore supervision
SP XXX Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related shortcomings
SV XXX Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX Violations
AV 000
Routine violations
AV 100
Exceptional
Total

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
9
31
46

0
4
15
22

14

7

0

0

0

0

32
60

15
28

18
38

8
18

0
0

0
0

2
2
37

1
1
18

12
7
0

6
3
0

17
1
212

8
0.5
100%

As shown in Figure 4-1, the result percentages for the 1st tier causal factors were fairly
distributed except for the preconditions for unsafe acts that got the highest percentage
(28%, N=60) and the outside factors which had the least (10%, N=22). Meanwhile,
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the organizational influences (22%,N=47), unsafe supervision (22%,N=46) and
unsafe acts (18%,N=37) got close scores.

18%

Outside Factors (PDI)

10%

Organizational Influences
22%

Unsafe Supervision
Preconditions for Unsafe
Acts
Unsafe Acts

28%

22%

Figure 4-1 1st Tier Contributory Factors

Furthermore, Figure 4-2 below, shows that PDI causal factors count is only a ninth
compared with the domestic ferry accident contributory factors (inside factors).

10%

Outside Factors (PDI)

Inside Factors ( Unsafe Acts,
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts,
Unsafe Supervision and
Organizational Influences)

90%

Figure 4-2 1st Tier Inside and Outside Factors
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4.2.1 Unsafe acts
For the Unsafe acts, almost half of the accident causal factors were attributed to
Routine violations.

For the 3rd tier of the first level of the HFACS coding process, the unsafe act level got
36 out of 212 accident causal factors. The unsafe act ranked second to the lowest,
just above the outside factors (PDI). A large portion of the accident causal factors was
attributed to routine violations (47%, N=17), skill-based error (31%, N=11), and
decision and judgment error (19%, N=7). Meanwhile, the least percentage went to
exceptional violation getting 3% (N=1) only (See Figure 4-3).

3%

Skill-based errors
32%

Decisions and
judgement errors
Routine violations

46%

Exceptional

19%

Figure 4-3 Unsafe Acts

Also, as shown in Table 4-4, the Routine Violations’ 4th tier category was further
narrowed down to violated standing orders and regulations (100%, N=17).
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Table 4-4 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Routine Violations
1st Tier
Unsafe acts
Total=37

2nd Tier
Violations

3rd Tier
Routine
Violations

18

4th Tier
Violated standing
orders and regulations

17

No.

%

17

100

17

100

Additionally, inaccurate passenger manifest (35%, N=6), improper cargo lashing
(18%, N=3), and overcrowding (18%, N=3) were the biggest contributors to routine
violations (See Table 4-5).

Table 4-5 Sub-factors in 4th tier Violated standing orders and regulations
4th Tier

Violated standing orders
and regulations

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Inaccurate passenger manifest

No.
6

%
35

Improper cargo lashing

3

18

Overcrowding

3

18

Overloading

1

6

Inadequate manning

1

6

Passenger staying inside the
vehicle at the cargo deck

1

6

Wrong TSS lane

1

6

No PMS

1

6

17

100

Total=17

Passenger manifest, per se, does not contribute to maritime accidents. However,
passenger manifest is very important in passenger accounting during search and
rescue operations and for the passenger’s insurance claims in case, anything bad
happens. Also, overcrowding of passengers can be verified from the ferries’
passenger manifest and authorized passenger capacity. Thus, the passenger
manifest needs to be accurate.
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Six (6) out of the twenty (20) ferries namely: MV Baleno 9, MBCA Alad Express 2, MV
Mercraft 3, MBCA Jenny Vince, MBCA Chi-chi, and MBCA Gesu de Bambino had an
inaccurate passenger manifest.

Knowing that the sea is a very unstable environment, proper cargo lashing is very
crucial to maintain the ferry’s stability in ro-ro passenger ferries and cargo-passenger
boats. The ferry’s instability endangers already the ferry itself and the lives of people
on board. Meanwhile, three (3) out of the thirteen (13) ferries namely: MV Princess of
the Stars, MV Baleno 9, and MV Maharlika 2 met accidents because of cargo shifting
due to the improper lashing of cargoes that either resulted in their capsizing or sinking.

Similarly, overcrowding of passengers, specifically in a small ferry, also affects the
boat's stability. Furthermore, the required lifesaving devices will not be sufficient if the
people onboard will exceed the authorized passenger capacity.

Furthermore, three (3) out of the twenty (20) ferries namely: MBCA Don Dexter,
MBCA Alad Express 2, and MBCA Kim Nirvana were overcrowded. However, MBCA
Don Dexter was overloaded because there was no PDI was conducted before it
departed due to the absence of a safety inspector in the area. Meanwhile, MBCA Alad
Express 2 exceeded one (1) passenger only. But in the case of MBCA Kim Nirvana,
PDI was conducted but the inspectors were remiss of their duty to prevent
overcrowding.
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Also, another five (5) ferries namely: MV Baleno 9, MV St. Thomas Aquinas, MBCA
Kim Nirvana, MV Mercraft 3, and MV Lite Ferry 16 had routine violations such as
passengers staying inside the vehicle at the cargo deck, inside the wrong lane at the
TSS, overloading, inadequate manning and no main engine planned maintenance,
respectively.

Also for the Unsafe acts, almost a third of the accident causal factors were attributed
to Skill-based errors.

As demonstrated in Table 4-6, skill-based errors were mainly divided into three (3)
sub-factors namely: Poor Seamanship (58%, N=7), procedures not used (25%, N=3)
and failed to see and avoid (17%, N=2). Furthermore, poor seamanship was attributed
to a master miscalculation (71%, N=5) and navigational failure (29%, N=2).

Table 4-6 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Skill-based Errors
1st Tier
Unsafe acts
Total=37

2nd Tier
Errors
19

3rd Tier
Skillbased
Errors
12

4th Tier
Poor Seamanship

No.
7

%
58

Procedures not used

3

25

Failed to see and avoid

2

17

12

100

As shown in Table 4-7, five (5) out of the seven (7) ferries linked with poor seamanship
category were MV Princess of the Stars, MV Cotabato Princess, MBCA Kim Nirvana,
LCT Poseidon 26, and MV Ocean Jet 12 had an accident due to the Master’s
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miscalculation. Meanwhile, the remaining two (2) ferries, namely: MV St. Thomas
Aquinas and MV Maria Matilde met an accident because of navigational failure by not
observing safe speed and the lack of situational awareness of the Officer on Watch
(OOW)..

Table 34-7 Sub-factors in 4th tier Poor seamanship
4th Tier
Poor seamanship

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Master miscalculation
Navigational failure

Total=7

No.
5

%
71

2

29

7

100

In addition, as illustrated in Table 4-8, MV Mercraft 3 and MV Virgin de Penafrancia
VII failed to execute crowd control and emergency procedures and failed to submit
updated safety documents, respectively.

Table 4-8 Sub-factors in 4th tier Procedures not used
4th Tier

Procedures not used

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Crowd control failure

No.
1

%
33

Emergency procedure execution
failure

1

33

Failure to submit updated safety
documents

1

33

3

100

Total=3

As shown in Table 4-9, MBCA Alad Express 2 and MV Island Roro-1 failed to see and
avoid the overcrowding of one (1) passenger and the overloaded 10 wheeler truck
loaded onboard, respectively.
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Table 4-9 Sub-factors in 4th tier Failed to see & avoid
4th Tier
Failed to see &
avoid

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Excess one (1) passenger
Overloaded 10 wheeler truck

Total=2

No.
1

%
50

1

50

2

100

Meanwhile, as demonstrated in Table 4-10, the decision and judgment errors is more
or less a fifth of all Unsafe acts causal factors. Its sub-factor is wrong decision making
during operation (100%, N=7) only.

Table 4-10 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Decision and judgment Errors
1st Tier
Unsafe acts
Total=37

2nd Tier
Errors
19

3rd Tier
Decision
and
judgment
Errors

4th Tier

No.

%

Wrong decision making
during operation

7

100

7

100

7

Six (6) out of twenty (20) ferries onboard operators committed seven (7) wrong
decisions during operations, namely: MV Princess of the Stars, MV Baleno 9, MV St
Thomas Aquinas, MV Starlite Atlantic 2, MV Maria Matilde, and MBCA Gesu de
Bambino. Their respective violations were deciding to proceed en route even with
typhoon signal, ballasting that caused the free surface effect, passing through
uncharted area, failing to communicate, choosing a sheltering area, failing to inform
the Master, and MBCA leaving one (1) crew in the water, respectively.
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4.2.2 Preconditions for Unsafe acts
For the Preconditions for unsafe acts, more than half of the accident causal factors
were attributed to Technological Environment. For the 3rd tier of the second level of
the HFACS coding process, the preconditions to unsafe act level got 60 out of 212
accident causal factors. The preconditions to unsafe act garnered the most number
of accident causal factors. Both physical and technological environments accounted
for 30%(N=18) and 64%(N=38), respectively. Meanwhile, the least percentage was
attributed to personal readiness and crew Interaction which both got 3%(N=2) only
(See Figure 4-4).
3% 3%

Physical environment
30%

Technological
environment
Crew Interaction

64%

Personal Readiness

Figure 4-4 Precondition for Unsafe Acts

As illustrated in Table 4-11, ship design and construction failure (47%, N=18),
equipment failure(21%, N=8), and procedural failure (11%, N=4) were the biggest
contributors to Technological Environment.
Table 4-11 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Technological Environment
1st Tier

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

Preconditions
for unsafe
acts

Environmen
tal Factors

Technolog
ical
Environ
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4th Tier
Ship design and
construction failure
Equipment failure

No.

%

18

47

8

21

ment

Total=60

56

Procedural failure

4

11

Support Service failure

2

5

Inadequate SAR Eqpt

3

8

Legal Issue

3

8

38

100

38

Furthermore, ship design and construction failure was divided into four (4) categories
namely: Stability failure (56%, N=10), Hull failure(17%, N=3), Watertight integrity
failure (11%, N=2), and Unsafe motorbanca roof design (17%, N=3). (See Table 412)
Table 4-12 Sub-factors in 4th tier Ship design and construction failure
4th Tier
Ship design and
construction failure

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Stability failure

No.
10

%
56

Hull failure

3

17

Watertight integrity failure

2

11

Unsafe design

3
18

17
100

Total=18

Relatedly, ten (10) out of twenty (20) ferries, namely: MV Princess of the Stars,
MBCA Don Dexter, MV Maharlika II, MV St. Thomas Aquinas, MBCA Kim Nirvana
B, MBCA Alad Express 2, MBCA Chichi, MBCA Keziah 2 MBCA Jenny Vince and
MV Island Roro-1 met an accident due to stability failure.

Meanwhile, MV Baleno 9, MV Mercraft 3, and MBCA Gesu De Bambino sustained
hull damage after, allegedly, being hit and battered by floating object and by squall,
respectively

Furthermore, MV Princess of the Stars, MV Maharlika II, and MV Starlite Atlantic 2
mishaps were attributed to the watertight integrity failure.

In addition, MBCA Chichi, MBCA Keziah 2, and MBCA Jenny Vince accidents were
exacerbated by the MBCA’s unsafe roofing that trapped the passengers and crew.
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Also, as indicated in Table 4-13, seven (7) out of the twenty (20) ferries namely: MV
Maharlika II, MV Starlite Atlantic 2, MV Lite Ferry 16, MBCA Chi-chi, MBCA Keziah
2, MBCA Jenny Vince and MBCA Gesu De Bambino had an equipment failure. One
of the ferries had two (2) equipment failures making its total of eight (8).

Table 4-13 Sub-factors in 4th tier Equipment failure
4th Tier

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Distress apparatus and radio
communication equipment not
readily available
No fire dampers

Equipment failure

No.

%

4

50

1

12.5

No maintenance of CO2 fire
extinguishing system

1

12.5

No back-up power

1

12.5

Steering Casualty

1

12.5

8

100

Total=8

On the other hand, almost a third of the Preconditions for unsafe acts accident causal
factors were attributed to the physical environment. Bad Weather (3%, N=15) was the
major accident contributor to the Physical environment. Meanwhile, hard floating
objects (3%, N=2) and Night Navigation (3%, N=1) were the other contributors to the
physical environment. (See Table 4-14)
Table 4-14 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Physical Environment
1st Tier
Preconditions
for unsafe
acts
Total=60

2nd Tier
Environmen
tal Factors
56

3rd Tier
Physical
Environ
ment

4th Tier
Weather

No.
15

%
83

Floating Object

2

11

Night Navigation

1

6

18

100

18

Also, bad weather is divided into eight (8) categories namely: typhoon (13%, N=2),
gale (13%, N=2), squall (33%, N=5), windy (13%, N=2), strong tornado (7%, N=1),
change of current and strong wind (7%, N=1), strong waves (7%, N=1) and dark
clouds with thunderstorms (7%, N=1). (See Table 4-15)
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Table 4-15 Sub-factors in 4th tier Weather
4th Tier

Weather

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
Typhoon

No.
2

%
13

Gale

2

13

Squall

5

33

Windy

2

13

Strong tornado

1

7

Strong waves

1

7

Sudden change of current and
strong wind

1

7

Dark with thunderstorms

1

7

15

100

Total=15

Also, fifteen (15) out of the twenty (20) ferries namely: MV Princess of the Stars,
MBCA Don Dexter, MV Baleno 9, MV Cotabato Princess, MV Maharlika II, MBCA Kim
Nirvana B, MV Starlite Atlantic 2, LCT Poseidon 26, MBCA Alad Express 2, MV Ma
Matilde, MV Ocean Jet 12, MV Mercraft 3, MBCA Chi-chi, MBCA Keziah 2, MBCA
Jenny Vince and MBCA Gesu De Bambino were affected by a bad weather.

MV Princess of the Stars and MV Starlite Atlantic 2 were only ferries battered by a
typhoon. MV Princess of the Stars was authorized to sail because policy allows it
having a big gross tonnage. Meanwhile, MV Starlite Atlantic 2 sailed out without
passengers just to take shelter.

On the other hand, MV Maharlika II and MV Mercraft 3 were faced with gale. Since
their gross tonnage were above 35GT, authorities allowed them to sail.

Furthermore, MBCA Don Dexter, MBCA Chic-hi, MBCA Keziah 2, MBCA Jenny Vince
and MBCA Gesu De Bambino capsized because of squall.

Lastly, MV Cotabato Princess, MBCA Kim Nirvana B, LCT Poseidon 26, MBCA Alad
Express 2, MV Ma Matilde, MV Ocean Jet 12 were other weather elements such as
wind, current, waves and tornado.
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4.2.3 Unsafe supervision
For the Unsafe supervision, more than 2/3 of the accident causal factors were
attributed to Supervisory violations or shipborne violations. For the 3rd tier of the third
level of the HFACS coding process, the unsafe supervision level got 44 out of 212
accident causal factors. Also, it was ranked third out of the five HFACS levels. Figure
4-5, as shown below, reveals a 2:1 ratio with a supervisory violation and inadequate
supervision having 70%(N=33) and 30%(N=14), respectively.
4.2.3 Unsafe supervision
For the Unsafe supervision, more than 2/3 of the accident causal factors were
attributed to Supervisory violations or shipborne violations. For the 3rd tier of the third
level of the HFACS coding process, the unsafe supervision level got 44 out of 212
accident causal factors. Also, it was ranked third out of the five HFACS levels. Figure
4-5 , as shown below, reveals a 2:1 ratio with supervisory violation and inadequate
supervision having 70%(N=33) and 30%(N=14), respectively.

30%

Inadequate supervision
Supervisory violations
70%

Figure 4-5 Unsafe Supervision

Additionally, shipborne violations is further broken down into failed to enforce rules
and regulation (58%, N=18), authorized unnecessary hazard (33%, N=11), violated
procedures (6%, N=2), and engaged unqualified crew (3%, N=1). (See Table 4-16)
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Table 4-16 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Shipborne violations
1st Tier

Unsafe
supervision

2nd Tier

Supervisory
violations

3rd Tier

Shipborne
violations

4th Tier
Failed to enforce rules
and regulation
Authorized
unnecessary hazard
Violated procedures
Engaged unqualified
crew

Total=46

32

32

No.

%

18

58

11

33

2

6

1

3

32

100

Furthermore, failed to enforce rules, and regulation was split into seven (7) smaller
categories namely: inaccurate passenger manifest (32%, N=6), improper lashing of
cargoes (16%, N=3), overcrowding (16%, N=2), inadequate support services (11%,
N=2), overloading (5%, N=1), lack supply, and materials (5%, N=1), and inadequate
manning(16%, N=2). (See Table 4-17)

Table 4-17 Sub-factors in 4th tier Failed to enforce rules and regulation
4th Tier

Failed to enforce rules
and regulation

Sub-factor in 4th Tier

No.

%

Inaccurate passenger manifest

6

33

Improper lashing of cargoes

3

17

Overcrowding

3

17

Inadequate support services

2

11

Overloading

1

6

Lack supply and materials
Inadequate manning

1
2
18

6
11
100

Total=18

The officers or the ferries’ leadership of the twelve (12) out of twenty (20) ferries
namely: MV Princess of the Stars, MBCA Don Dexter, MV Baleno 9, MV Cotabato
Princess, MV Maharlika II, MBCA Kim Nirvana B, MBCA Alad Express 2, MV Ma
Matilde, MV Mercraft 3, MBCA Chi-chi, MBCA Keziah 2, MBCA Jenny Vince failed to
enforce rules and regulations.
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Meanwhile, MV Princess of the Stars, MV Baleno 9, MBCA Kim Nirvana B, MV Starlite
Atlantic 2, MV Ma Matilde, MV Lite Ferry 16, and MBCA Gesu De Bambino’s Masters
deliberately authorized unnecessary hazards. Such unnecessary hazards include the
decision to proceed even with typhoon signal; passing through an uncharted area;
allowing passengers to stay inside the vehicle at the cargo deck and others.

Also, for the unsafe supervision, the remaining 1/3 of the accident causal factors were
attributed to inadequate supervision or shipborne and shore supervision.

Moreover, shipborne and shore supervision is further narrowed down to leadership/
supervision/ oversight inadequate (100%, N=14) only. (See Table 4-18)

Table 4-18 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Shipborne and shore supervision
1st Tier
Unsafe
supervision
Total=44

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

Inadequate
Supervision

Shipborne
and shore
supervision

14

14

4th Tier
Leadership/
supervision/ oversight
inadequate

No.

%

14

100

14

100

Also, leadership, supervision, and oversight inadequate was observed in the following
ferries namely: MBCA Don Dexter, MV St Thomas Aquinas, MV Starlite Atlantic 2,
MV Mercraft 3, MV Virgin De Penafrancia VII, MBCA Chi-chi, MBCA Keziah 2, MBCA
Jenny Vince and MV Island Roro 1.

Inadequate leadership, supervision, and

oversight examples were passengers shifting to portside, failure to reduce speed,
failure to communicate, failure to close engine room cover, and others.
4.2.4 Organizational Influence
Similarly, for the Organizational Influence, 2/3 of the accident causal factors were
attributed to Oversight failures.
For the 3rd tier of the fourth level of the HFACS coding process, the organizational
influence level got 47 out of 212 accident causal factors. The organizational influence
ranked second with the most number of causal factors.
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The majority of the causal factors were attributed to oversight 66%(N=31) and
procedures 19%(N=9) which falls under organizational process. Meanwhile,
equipment/facility resources and human resources under the resource management
had 11%(N=5) and 4%(N=2), respectively. However, organizational climate with
structure, policies, and culture sub-factors got zero. (See Figure 4-6)

4%
11%

Human resources

Equipment/Facility
resources
Procedures

19%
66%

Oversight
Figure 4-6 Organizational Influences

For the Organizational Influences, 2/3 of the accident causal factors were attributed
to oversight. Relatedly, oversight was further narrowed down to monitoring and
checking of resources, climate, and processes to ensure a safe work environment
(100%, N=31) only. (See Table 4-19)
Table 4-19 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Oversight
1st Tier

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

4th Tier

No.

%

31

100

31

100

Monitoring and
Organization

Organizatio

al Influences

nal Process

Total=47

40

Oversight

checking of resources,
climate and processes
to ensure a safe work

31

environment

As shown in Table 4-20, under the monitoring and checking of resources, climate,
and processes to ensure a safe work environment, fifteen (15) out of twenty (20)
ferries namely: MV Princess of the Stars, MBCA Don Dexter, MV Baleno 9, MV
Starlite Atlantic 2, LCT Poseidon 26, MV Ma Matilde, MV Ocean Jet 12, MV Mercraft
3, MV Virgin De Penafrancia VII, MV Lite Ferry 16, MBCA Chi-chi, MBCA Keziah 2,
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MBCA Jenny Vince, MV Island Roro and MBCA Gesu De Bambino were found to
generally had SMS failures. Some safety management failures included no planned
maintenance of equipment, not observing safety policies, and others.

Additionally, under the monitoring and checking of resources, climate, and processes
to ensure a safe work environment category, six (6) out of the twenty (20) ferries, as
earlier mentioned, had an inaccurate passenger manifest. Meanwhile, three (3) out of
the twenty (20) ferries met accidents because of cargo shifting due to the improper
lashing of cargoes and three (3) out of the twenty (20) ferries were overcrowded. (See
Table 4-20)
Table 4-20 Sub-factors in 4th tier Monitoring and checking of resources, climate
and processes to ensure a safe work environment
4th Tier
Monitoring and checking
of resources, climate
and processes to
ensure a safe work
environment

Sub-factor in 4th Tier
SMS Failure

No.
17

%
55

Inaccurate passenger manifest

6

19

Improper lashing of cargoes

3

10

Overloading

1

3

Overcrowding
Modification failure

3
1
31

10
3
100

Total=31

Also, under the Organizational Influences, almost 1/5 of the accident causal factors
were attributed to Procedure. Similarly, the procedure was further narrowed down to
Procedural guidance and publications (100%, N=9). (See Table 4-21)
Table 4-21 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Procedure
1st Tier

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

Organizationa
l Influences

Organizatio
nal Process

Procedure

40

9

Total=47

77

4th Tier
Procedural guidance
and publications

No.

%

9

100

9

100

MV St Thomas Aquinas, MBCA Kim Nirvana B, MV Starlite Atlantic 2, MV Mercraft 3,
MV Lite Ferry 16, and MBCA Gesu De Bambino encountered procedural guidance
and publications failures.

Similarly, the resource management under organizational influences was broken
down into two (2) smaller 3rd tier factors namely: Human and Equipment resources.
Furthermore, both the Human and Equipment resources have their own 3rd tier subfactors namely: inadequate safe manning (N=2) and lack of equipment/supplies
(N=5). (See Tables 4-22 & 4-23)
Table 4-22 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Human resource
1st Tier
Organizationa
l Influences
Total=47

2nd Tier
Resource
manageme
nt
7

3rd Tier
Human
resource

4th Tier
Inadequate safe
manning

2

No.

%

2

100

2

100

Meanwhile, both the MV Cotabato Princess and MV Mercraft 3 were found to have
inadequate safe manning.

Table 44-23 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Equipment resource
1st Tier
Organizationa
l Influences
Total=47

2nd Tier
Resource
manageme
nt
7

3rd Tier
Equipmen
t resource

4th Tier
Lack of
equipment/supplies

5

No.

%

5

100

5

100

Furthermore, MV Cotabato Princess, MV Maharlika II, MV Starlite Atlantic 2, MV Ma
Matilde, and MV Lite Ferry 16 exhibited a lack of supplies and equipment by having
no tugboat assistance, cargo lashing equipment, back-up power, bell books, Quarter
Masters logbook and fire dampers, respectively.
4.2.5 Pre-Departure Inspection
For the PDI, more than 4/5 of the accident causal factors were attributed to Routine
violations. For the 3rd tier of the fifth level of the HFACS coding process, the PDI
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level got 22 out of 212 accident causal factors. For this level, almost a third of a quarter
of the accident causal factors were attributed to the PDI Violation (82%, N=18). The
remaining 3rd tier factors namely: Rules and regulation, PDI error, and Absence of
PDI accounted for 4%(N=1), 9%(N=2), and 5%(N=1), respectively. (See Figure 4-7)

4%

5%

Rules and
Regulations
Absence of PDI

9%

PDI Error
PDI Violation

82%

Figure 4-7 PDI related factors

Inaccurate passenger manifest (33%, N=6), emergency and communication
equipment not readily available (22%, N=4), inadequate manning (11%, N=2),
improper lashing of cargoes (17%, N=3), overcrowding (11%, N=2) and overloading
(6%, N=1) were the contributors to PDI violations. (See Table 4-24)
Table 4-24 4th Tier in 3rd Tier PDI Violations
1st Tier

Outside
factors (PDI)

Total=22

2nd Tier

PDI Enforce
ment
Related
Issues

21

3rd Tier

PDI
Violations

18

79

4th Tier
Inaccurate passenger
manifest

No.

%

6

33

4

22

Inadequate manning
Improper lashing of
cargoes
Overcrowding

2

11

3

17

2

11

Overloading

1

6

18

100

Emergency and radio
communication
equipment not readily
available

Under the PDI violations category, some inspectors violated regulations on safety
documents, passenger manifest, equipment in good operating condition, proper
lashing of cargoes, overcrowding, overloading, adequate and certificated manning.
However, no PDI violation was made on the enforcement of the “No sail policy” during
bad weather.

PDI Inspectors' safety regulation violations were noted on the following ferries,
namely: MV Baleno 9, MV Cotabato Princess, MV Maharlika II, MBCA Kim Nirvana,
MBCA Alad Express 2, MV Mercraft 3, MBCA ChichI, MBCA Keziah 2, MBCA Jenny
Vince and MBCA Gesu De Bambino.

Additionally, PDI Error happened onboard MV Princess of the Star and MBCA Alad
Express 2 wherein the inspector failed to verify the correctness of the Certificate of
Stability and failed to prevent overcrowding of one (1) excess passenger, respectively.
(See Table 4-25)
Table 4-25 4th Tier in 3rd Tier PDI Error
1st Tier
Outside
factors (PDI)
Total=22

2nd Tier
PDI
Enforcemen
t Related
Issues
21

3rd Tier
PDI Error

4th Tier
Certificate of stability
entry

No.

%

1

50

Passenger manifest

1

50

2

100

2

As shown in Table 4-26, the government regulators encountered one (1) regulatory
challenge on the Sailing Policy during Bad weather that contributed to the capsizing
of MV Princess of the Stars. Fortunately, the Sailing Policy during Bad weather was
amended and refined to what it is now.
Table 4-26 4th Tier in 3rd Tier Rules and regulations
1st Tier

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

4th Tier

No.

%

Outside
factors (PDI)

PDI and
Other
Related
Regulations

Rules and
regulation
s

Movement of vessels
during heavy weather

1

100

80

Total=22

1

1

1

100

Also, the Absence of PDI happened only in the case of MBCA Don Dexter which
resulted to its overcrowding.
4.3 Safe Ferry Model and HFACS Results Comparison
To logically present and discuss the identified accident causal factors of the
Philippines ferry industry including the pre-departure inspection enforcement, the said
causal factors were fitted, as applicable, to the Model of a Safe Ferry (Dalziel &
Weisbrod, 2012)(See Table 4-27).
4.3.1 Ferry Operator Safety Culture
The HFACS coding results revealed that under the Ferry Operator Safety Culture,
some of the ferries in this study were not suited in their intended service and were not
well-maintained. A number of them have stability, hull Integrity, watertight integrity,
and unsafe design issues. Also, improper lashing of cargoes and lack of supply and
materials indicated that some of the ferries were not properly operated and
maintained.

Furthermore, the SMS failure, inadequate leadership and oversight, procedure failure,
inaccurate passenger manifest, overcrowding, overloading, navigational failure, and
inadequate support services are indicative of the huge safety management
challenges of some of the country’s ferries. Also, the crew’s number and crew
competence gaps were highlighted by the Master’s miscalculation and the inadequate
manning, crew interaction, and personal readiness.
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Table 4-27 Model of Safe Ferry vs HFACS-PDI Accident Causal Factors
MODEL OF SAFE FERRY

ACCIDENT CAUSAL FACTORS

NO

Stability failure
Ships suitable for intended Hull failure
Watertight integrity failure
service
Unsafe motorbanca roof design
Lack supply and materials
Improper cargo lashing
SMS Failure
Leadership/ oversight inadequate
Procedure failure
Well-maintained ships
Inaccurate passenger manifest
Overcrowding
Overloading
Navigational failure
Inadequate support services
Master miscalculation
Inadequate manning
Properly operated, crewed ships Crew Interaction
Personal readiness
Regulatory regime:
Appropriate regulations
Absent and outdated regulations
Absence of PDI
Enforcement
PDI Errors
PDI Violations
Squall
Typhoon
Hazardous Weather
Notification
Gale
Windy
Emergency Response
Communication
Alerting
Emergency and radio equipment
/Location
not readily available

10
3
2
3
5
3
17
14
9
6
2
1
2
2
4
2
2
2

Rescue / assistance resources
Knowledgeable Passengers

0
0

Ferry Operator Safety Culture:

1

2

3

4

5

Alleged Overloading

1
1
2
18
5
2
2
2

4

Generally, safety violations were prevalent in majority of the ferries’ different levels of
echelon. (See Table 4-28) Such poor safety culture can be attributed to the regulators
lapses in enforcement.
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Table 4-28 Domestic Ferry and PDI Violations
Safety
Ferry Organization

Enforce

work environment

PDI
Violations
ensure
a safe

and processes to

resources, climate

checking of

Lapses in
regulation

rules and

Failed to enforce

Equipment Failure

Violated orders

ment

Inaccurate passenger manifest

6

6

6

6

Improper cargo lashing

3

3

3

3

Overcrowding

3

3

3

2

Overloading

1

1

1

1

Inadequate manning

2

2

2

2

Emergency and radio
communication equipment not

4

4

readily available
Total

14

4

14

14

18

4.3.2 Regulatory regime
Under the regulatory regime sub-topic particularly in the appropriate regulations and
standards category, the absent and outdated regulations were also pinpointed to be
contributory factors to ferry accidents. Mainly, the absent and outdated regulations
were attributed to the absence of the safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk profile,
certification, and enforcement) information system and the safety inspector’s
performance oversight policies and infrastructure, and the outdated policy on the
guidance on the movement of vessels during heavy weather. However, at present,
the typhoon policy was already addressed by updating the old regulation.

As shown in Table 4-29, some of the accident causal factors were addressed by the
PDI, while, others were not. Based on the HFACS results, PDI was only effective in
implementing “No sailing policy” and proper cargo lashing, checking the ferries' safety
documents, preventing overcrowding, and checking life-saving appliances only.
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However, PDI inspectors have difficulties and were not so effective in ensuring ferry
stability, verifying the actual operating condition of the ferry itself and its equipment,
preventing overloading, and ensuring an accurate passenger manifest because such
inspection concerns are more technical and require more than the capability of the
naked eye. Furthermore, because of time constraints, thorough checking was quite a
challenge.

Table 54-29 PDI strengths and weaknesses
Strengths

Weaknesses

 Enforcing “No sailing policy” during
bad weather

 Ensuring ferry’s stability

 Implementing the proper cargo
lashing

 Verifying the actual operating
condition of the ferry itself and its
equipment

 Checking the completeness and
credibility of ferry and crew safety
documents

 Preventing overloading

 Preventing overcrowding

 Ensuring the passenger manifest
accurateness

 Checking of lifesaving equipment
Additionally, one (1) out of the twenty (20) of the maritime accidents did not undergo
PDI due to the absence of a PDI inspector in the area. Relatedly, the said MBCA was
found to be overcrowded and had an inaccurate passenger manifest. However, the
direct cause of the accident was the unsafe design and instability of the MBCA which
was triggered by the squall resulting in its capsizing. Also, PDI errors were committed
by inspectors when one (1) passenger exceeded the authorized capacity and one (1)
erroneous safety document was overlooked.

Meanwhile, PDI violations got the biggest number under the regulatory regime
enforcement. This big number in the PDI violation is indicative that inspectors were
either lax or overburdened with their duties. Although, safety regulations were
communicated, yet, PDI violations were still committed.
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4.3.3 Hazardous Weather Notification
Out of the twenty (20) ferry boats used in this study, fifteen (15) of them were affected
by bad weather that resulted in accidents or incidents. However, only typhoon and
gale warning advisories are being forecasted by the country’s weather bureau. The
remaining weather phenomenon such as squalls, wind, sea current, and waves have
no forecast. As such, it can be concluded that the country’s sea environment is very
unstable and unpredictable, especially, twenty-two (22) typhoons on an average visit
every year. The sea’s instability, unpredictability, and harshness are a fact that every
domestic ferry crew or a mariner should constantly master. Thus, ferry boat design
and construction should be made or repaired within the highest safety design and
construction standards.
4.3.4 Emergency Response
For this element, only emergency and radio communication equipment not readily
available fell under the communication- alerting and location. The search and rescue
party will not be alerted for any maritime distress if the communication equipment is
not readily available aboard ferry boats. Based on the HFACS coding process, four
(4) MBCA’s were found to have shortcomings in the communication and emergency
equipment requirement.
4.3.5 Knowledgeable Passengers
Although the knowledgeable passenger element of the Safe ferry model is not part of
the HFACS coding, an example of this was demonstrated in one (1) of the twenty (20)
investigation reports. One of the passengers aboard MV Virgin de Penafrancia VII
complained and alleged that the said ferry vessel was overloaded after observing
crowded passengers. After conducting a thorough investigation, it was found out that
the safety certificates indicating the authorized capacity were not updated by the
issuing agency. Updated safety certificate which was provided later on, proved that
the allegation was incorrect. Nevertheless, the incident clarified the vessel authorized
capacity for future inspections.

Although the passenger allegation was proven to be wrong, it was a good sign that
passengers already have some knowledge about the ferry’s safety regulations.
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Moreover, the said passenger’s vigilance and participation in the maritime safety
checks and balance process by responsibly reporting his observation is another
avenue in the cultivation of safety culture in the ferry industry.
4.4 Validation of the Study
This research HFACS results showed the many similarities with the MARINA (2019)
MIDP particularly in its PTA. Accordingly, one of the challenges in the country’s
maritime sector is the poor quality of sea transport system which can be directly linked
with the poor ferry operator’s safety culture.

Furthermore, the said PTA elaborated that shortage of qualified of officers and crew
and aging fleet were contributory factors, also. Similarly, the research found out that
poor crew competence and poor ferry design and construction significantly
contributed to mishaps. Although, aging fleet and poor ferry design and construction
are two different factors, their link can be clarified later on.

Meanwhile, weak regulation and supervision factor identified in the problem tree
analysis strengthens the research data results which illustrated the regulators lapses
in its enforcement. Lastly, the fragmented maritime administration reported in the PTA
is likewise glaring in the fragmented safety enforcement activities of different agencies
and in the absence of safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk profile, certification and
enforcement) information system policy and infrastructure. Moreover, bad weather
was not included in the above mentioned analysis.
On the one hand, the World Bank and IFC (2014) described the country’s domestic
shipping industry with high costs, low quality of service, and a poor safety record. The
poor safety record is proven by the twenty (20) accidents and incidents from 20082020.

Similarly, according to PCG Report (2017), maritime accidents are largely attributable
to three main factors: Ship Management (vessel maintenance, crew competence);
Government Regulatory Enforcement (MARINA & PCG); and the Riding Public. The
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role of the riding public was recognized by the PCG in the process of improving ferry
safety.

According to Golden and Weisbrod (2016), sea mishaps in developing countries are
caused by the acquisition of outdated, substandard, and/or inappropriate vessels;
overcrowding; insufficient training and sudden hazardous weather. This confirms that
poor seamanship, poor design, construction, equipment and stability and bad weather
are major contributory factors to maritime accidents.

Also, in research from Faturachman and Mustafa (2012) regarding Indonesian Sea
Transportation Accidents, the three (3) major accident causative factors identified are:
human, technical and natural factors. In comparison, the HFACS results in this
publication are very similar to those in the above study.

Additionally, Interferry report (2019) confirmed the research result that the Philippines
maritime safety improvements was substantially brought about by the stringent
enforcement of “No sailing policy” during bad weather.
Similar to this papers’ suggestions, Sigua and Aguilar (2003) proposed the below
enumerated recommendations:


Accurate sea state prediction with a system for warning/barring different
vessel sizes from departing or undertaking voyages



Standards for small crafts particularly the outrigger boats and old vessels
including hull structural specifications, loading, engine, equipment and age
limits.



Safe harbors and anchorages



Ensure crew competence and safety procedure capabilities



Make sure the passengers are aware of emergency procedures in mandatory
manner



Institute rigid measures for inspecting second hand vessels.

Finally, Sigua and Aguilar (2003), recommended the usage of a comprehensive
Geographic Information System (GIS) which has shown to be a valuable tool in
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integrating numerous functions such as mapping, modelling, querying, and analyzing
vast amounts of data housed in a single database about maritime accidents and
incidents.
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Chapter 5

ACCIMAP RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the HFACS accident causal factors from the previous chapter were
utilized to illustrate a clearer and broader picture of the various accident scenarios
and show their interrelationships with the help of the AcciMap Model. Furthermore,
the twenty (20) accidents and incidents were narrowed down to four (4) accident
maps, categorized per accident type such as capsizing, sinking/submerging,
ramming/collision/allision, and fire.
5.1 Capsizing
As shown in Figure 5-1 below, a total of eight (8) capsizing accidents transpired out
of the twenty (20) ferries which resulted in 964 deaths.

Under the physical, actor, and events processes and condition level, four (4) major
causal factors were noted in capsizing accidents namely: poor safety management,
poor seamanship, poor design and construction, and bad weather.

Out of the eight (8) capsizing accidents, MV Island Roro-1, alone and without weather
disturbance, lost its stability solely because of cargo shifting of an overloaded truck
that slipped to the side of the vessel during discharging operation in port. This accident
was caused by the combination of poor safety management and poor seamanship
only.

Similarly, MV Princess of the Stars capsized because of cargo shifting. However,
cargo shifting was triggered and made worse by the unfavorable sea condition
brought by a typhoon. Also, it has some design and construction issues. But most
importantly, the Master’s poor seamanship itself brought the said vessel into harm’s
way. In this accident, all of the four major causal factors contributed to the accident.
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Not updated
MBCA design &
construction
Policy (2019)

PHYSICAL/ ACTOR EVENTS,
PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS
OUTCOME

No policy for
Inspector’s
Performance
Oversight

PDI enforcement lapses
- Improper lashing of cargoes
- Overcrowding
- Inaccurate Passenger manifest
- Overloading

No policy and
infrastructure for
safety inspector’s
centralized (ship risk
profile, certification
and enforcement)
information system

Other Safety Inspections lapses
- Ferries design, construction, equipment and
stability inspection, survey and certification
- Crew training, assessment and certification
-Safety Management System Audit and
Certification
- Vessel Safety Enforcement Inspection (VSEI)
-Emergency Readiness Evaluation (ERE)

Poor Organizational Safety Culture
-Weak monitoring and checking of resources,
climate and processes to ensure a safe work
environment
-Leadership/supervision/ oversight inadequate
-Failed to enforce rules and regulation
-Authorized unnecessary hazard
-Violated procedures

ORGANIZATIONAL

EXTERNAL

Not Updated
Typhoon
Policy (2008)

Poor Safety
Management
- Improper lashing of
cargo (1)
- Overcrowding (3)
- Inaccurate
Passenger manifest
(2)
- Overloading (2)

Poor Seamanship

-Typhoon evasion
failure (1)
-Unsafe
maneuvering(1)

Poor Design and
Construction

-Stability Failure (6)
- Unsafe roof
design (3)

Capsizing (8)
Death- 964

Figure 5-1 Accimap Model for Capsizing
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Bad
Weather
-Typhoon (1)
- Squall (1)
-Tornado (1)
- Strong
waves (1)

Meanwhile, five (5) out of six (6) wooden boats namely, MBCA Don Dexter, MBCA
Alad Express 2, MBCA Keziah, MBCA Chi-chi, and MBCA Jenny Vince with design
and construction issues combined with bad weather resulted in their capsizing. Aside
from the bad weather and its design and construction, MBCA Kim Nirvana’s instability
was further exacerbated by the Master’s wrong maneuver by steering hard port and
placing one of the throttles in full ahead and the other in a full-back.

As such, at the organization level, the Ferry Safety Culture was classified to be poor
in general, partially, because of the PDI and other safety inspection enforcements
shortcomings.

These lapses in enforcement were further rooted in the absence of rules and not
updated policies.

The not updated typhoon policy can be traced back to 2008 during the capsizing of
the ill-fated MV Princess of the Stars where the bigger vessel with larger gross
tonnages was still allowed to sail. However, the said policy was already amended,
thus, sea accidents were significantly reduced.

Also, MBCA design and construction still need to be revisited and revised, although,
there is already a policy to phase out all passenger MBCA’s.
Furthermore, there is also an absence of a safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk
profile, certification, and enforcement) information system and the safety inspector’s
performance oversight policies and infrastructure. The centralized information system
is a very powerful tool for inspectors to control and target delinquent and substandard
vessels. Also, inspector performance oversight aims to counter-check the safety
inspection procedures and implementations. Without these mechanisms, safety
enforcement will remain to be fragmented and very loose having very little control.
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Additionally, for capsizing accidents, as shown in Table 5-1, it is very common for the
30 gross tonnage and below MBCA’s to lose their stability once confronted with very
strong winds such as squalls. The MBCA’s design with non-aerodynamic roofing or
superstructure was not fit with unfavorable weather conditions causing numerous
casualties.

Out of the twenty (20) ferries included in this study, six (6) wooden ferries were
involved in capsizing accidents. While four (4) of them were purely passenger ferries
and the two (2) are pax-cargo ferries.
Table 65-1 Summary of Capsizing Accidents
DATE

VESSEL

GRT

AGE

HULL

FERRY

TRADING

MATERIAL

TYPE

LICENSE

MV PRINCESS
Jun-08

OF THE

23,800

24

STEEL

ROPAX

STARS
Nov08
Jul-15

Jun-17
Aug19
Aug19
Aug19
Dec19

MBCA
DON DEXTER
MBCA KIM
NIRVANA B
MBCA ALAD
EXPRESS 2
MBCA CHICHI

MBCA KEZIAH
MBCA JENNY
VINCE
MV ISLAND
RORO 1

13.7

6

WOODEN

33

4

WOODEN

12.8

19

10

4

COAST
WISE

PAX-

BAY &

CARGO

RIVER

PAX-

COAST

CARGO

WISE

WOODEN

PAX

WOODEN

PAX

5

47

WOODEN

PAX

10.6

15

WOODEN

PAX

196

41

STEEL

ROPAX

92

COAST
WISE
BAY &
RIVER
BAY &
RIVER
BAY &
RIVER
COAST
WISE

LOCATION

AT SEA
(NEAR
SHORE)

STABILIT

CAS

Y

UALT

FAILURE

Y

CARGO
SHIFTING

AT SEA

814

52

IN PORT

62
MBCA

AT SEA

DESIGN

5

(NOT
AT SEA

AERO

11

DYNAMIC)
AT SEA

0

AT SEA

20

IN PORT

CARGO
SHIFTING

0

Meanwhile, out of the six (6) wooden ferries, five (5) of them met an accident at sea
but just capsized and did not sink. This is another thought that contradicts the claim
the MBCA’s in themselves are unsafe. As long as MBCA’s are not loaded with heavy
cargoes, they will not sink because wooden materials float.
Arguably, then, why there were high fatalities for these MBCA’s? In one of the
investigation reports, it was also highlighted that the MBCA’s roofing or superstructure
traps the passengers causing deaths.

On the other hand, the other two (2) ferries, both steel-hulled, involved in the capsizing
incident were affected by the cargo shifting. Out of the two (2), one (1) was additionally
battered by a typhoon, while the other, happened during discharging operation. It can
be noticed also that, luckily, both capsized because both were in shallow waters. If
not, they would have sunk.
Additionally, ferries’ stability condition was further affected by the cargoes it loads,
posing danger to the lives of the passengers. As a result, the MARINA already issued
a policy phasing out passenger MBCA’s with corresponding conditions and
exemptions. Nevertheless, MBCA’s design needs to be revisited for the safety of other
industries ’ purposes. Also, boats can be classified purely either as passenger or
cargo-only to mitigate the risk of cargo to passengers.

The casualty for capsizing accidents is relatively high because passengers are
trapped inside the ferries attributable to the ferries' design. Also, the above case
showed that poor MBCA design and construction and bad weather (squall)
combination were already hazardous for the crew and the passengers.
5.2 Sinking/Submerging
Meanwhile, Figure 5-2 shows a total of five (5) sinking and one (1) submerging
accident that occurred out of the twenty (20) ferries and resulted in 206 deaths as an
outcome.
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Similar to the capsizing accidents, under the physical, actor, and events processes
and condition level, sinking accidents were caused by poor safety management, poor
seamanship, poor design and construction, and bad weather, plus physical
environment which refers to hard floating objects.

MV Baleno 9, MV Mercraft 3, and MBCA Gesu de Bambino had their hull raptured
that caused the two formers to sink and the latter to submerge. Out of the three (3),
MV Baleno 9 was the only ferry not affected by bad weather, while MV Mercraft 3 and
MBCA Gesu de Bambino encountered bad weather at sea. Also, both MV Baleno 9
and MV Mercraft 3 alleged that they hit a hard floating object.

On the other hand, MV St. Thomas Aquinas, MV Maharlika 2, and MV Starlite Atlantic
2, all suffered watertight integrity failures. MV St. Thomas Aquinas's watertight
integrity failure was caused by the collision with MV Sulpicio Express 7.
Meanwhile, MV Maharlika 2’s sinking was brought about by its cargo shifting triggered
by the unfavorable weather that resulted in the flooding of the steering room. Lastly,
MV Starlite Atlantic 2’s open car deck caused its watertight integrity breach which was
also battered by a typhoon.

As explained above, the Poor Ferry Organizational Safety Culture was also prevalent
in the said ferries because of some lapses in both the PDI and other Safety Inspection
Enforcements. In like manner, the said enforcement lapses were rooted in the
absence of policies and infrastructure on the safety
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PHYSICAL/ ACTOR EVENTS,
PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS
OUTCOME

No policy and infrastructure
for safety inspector’s
centralized (ship risk profile,
certification and enforcement)
information system

Other Safety Inspections lapses
- Ferries design, construction, equipment and
stability inspection, survey and certification
- Crew training, assessment and certification
-Safety Management System Audit and
Certification
- Vessel Safety Enforcement Inspection (VSEI)
-Emergency Readiness Evaluation (ERE)

PDI enforcement lapses
- Improper lashing of cargoes
- Overcrowding
- Inaccurate Passenger manifest
- Overloading

Poor Organizational Safety Culture
-Weak monitoring and checking of resources,
climate and processes to ensure a safe work
environment
-Leadership/supervision/ oversight inadequate
-Failed to enforce rules and regulation
-Authorized unnecessary hazard
-Violated procedures

ORGANIZATIONAL

EXTERNAL

No policy for
Inspector’s
Performance
Oversight

Poor Safety
Management
- Improper lashing of
cargo (2)
- Inaccurate Passenger
manifest (2)
- Inadequate manning (1)

Poor Seamanship
-Master
miscalculation (1)
-Navigational Failure
(1)

Poor Design,
Construction &
Equipment
-Hull Integrity Failure
(4)
-Stability Failure (1)
-Equipment Failure
(2)

- Emergency procedure
failure (2)
- Communication failure
(2)
- Passengers staying
inside the vehicle (1)

Sinking (5) & Submerging (1)
Death- 206

Figure 5-2 Accimap Model for Sinking and Submerging
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Bad Weather
& Physical
environment

--Typhoon (1)
- Gale warning
(2)
-Floating
Objects (2)

As shown in Table 5-2, four (4) out of five (5) were steel-hulled, while, the other one
(1) was made of fiberglass.

Table 5-2. Summary of Sinking & Submerging Accidents
DATE

VESSEL

Dec09

MV BALENO
9
MV THOMAS
AQUINAS
(Collision)
MV
MAHARLIKA
II
MV
STARLITE
ATLANTIC 2
MV
MERCRAFT3
MBCA GESU
DE BAMBINO
(Sub
merging)

Aug13
Sep14
Dec16
Dec17
Nov20

GRT

AGE

HULL
MATER
IAL

FER
RY
TYPE

199

17

STEEL

RO
PAX

TRADI
NG
LICEN
SE
COAST
WISE

LOCA
TION

HULL, STABILITY &
WATERTIGHT
INTEGRITY FAILURE

CASUAL
TY

AT SEA

HULL RAPTURED

50

HULL
COMPROMISED
DUE TO COLLISION
CARGO SHIFTING
PLUS FLOODING AT
STEERING ROOM

1405

40

STEEL

RO
PAX

COAST
WISE

AT TSS

1865

30

STEEL

RO
PAX

COAST
WISE

AT SEA

1407

41

STEEL

RO
PAX

COAST
WISE

AT SEA

CAR DECK IS OPEN

19

206

1

FIBER
GLASS

PAX

COAST
WISE

AT SEA

HULL RAPTURED

14

19

10

WOOD
EN

PAX

BAY &
RIVER

AT SEA

HULL RAPTURED

1

120

8

In addition, another glaring point observed was the location of the accident which
occurred in the open sea described with deep waters. Thus, once the hull integrity,
the watertight integrity, and stability are compromised, if it is made of steel or
fiberglass, surely, it will sink. The capsizing of the MV Princess of the Stars and the
MV Island Roro-1 could have further resulted in sinking if it did not happen in shallow
waters.

Regarding the four (4) steel-hulled and one (1) fiberglass-made ferries, their damage
stability and compartmentalization features were likewise questionable. Arguably,
ships should be designed and constructed with these features to ensure floating ability
even they incurred damage. Similarly, the casualty for sinking accidents is also high
because passengers are trapped inside the ferries attributable to the ferries' design.

5.3 Ramming/Collision/Allision
Furthermore, Figure 5-3 exhibited three (3) ramming, one (1) collision, and one (1)
allision incident which resulted in zero deaths. Similar to the capsizing and sinking
accidents, under the physical, actor, and events processes and condition level,
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ramming, collision, and allision incidents and accidents were caused by poor safety
management, poor seamanship, and bad weather plus support service failure.

Both MV Cotabato Princess and MV Ocean Jet 12 rammed a pier during a docking
maneuver. Likewise, Masters of both ferries claimed that their docking maneuver was
affected by bad weather. Also, MV Cotabato Princess did not have a pilot onboard
and tug assistance as required by the Port Authority.

Meanwhile, MV Maria Matilde rammed a wall of mountain rock in the island of
Romblon due to the Officer of Watch (OOW) and the entire bridge team's lack of
situational awareness during navigation. Also, LCT Poseidon, on the other hand, had
an allision with another stationary vessel mainly due to the Master’s poor seamanship
and worsened by the bad weather also.

Lastly, MV Thomas Aquinas collided with MV Sulpicio Express 7 because of the lack
of communication between the two vessels. Although, the latter was inside the wrong
lane in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). Available communication equipment
was not utilized to its maximum to ensure collision avoidance and safety of navigation.
Additionally, the absence of a lighted buoy in the TSS was an add-on factor to the
accident.

In like manner, under the organizational level, the Poor Ferry Safety Culture was also
prevalent in the said ferries solely because of other safety inspection enforcements
shortcomings. On the map, PDI has no participation in safety enforcement except for
checking the correctness of the ferries’ manning requirement. Also, the said
enforcement lapses were rooted in the absence of policies and infrastructure on the
safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk profile, certification, and enforcement)
information system and the safety inspector’s performance oversight.
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EXTERNAL

No policy for
Inspector’s
Performance
Oversight

No policy and infrastructure
for safety inspector’s
centralized (ship risk profile,
certification and
enforcement) information
system

Other Safety Inspections lapses
- Crew training, assessment and certification
-Safety Management System Audit and Certification
- Vessel Safety Enforcement Inspection (VSEI)
-Emergency Readiness Evaluation (ERE)

OUTCOME

PHYSICAL/ ACTOR EVENTS,
PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL

Poor Organizational Safety Culture
-Weak monitoring and checking of resources,
climate and processes to ensure a safe work
environment
-Leadership/supervision/ oversight inadequate
-Failed to enforce rules and regulation
-Authorized unnecessary hazard
-Violated procedures

Poor Safety
Management
- Failed to inform the
Master (1)
- Communication failure
(1)

Poor Seamanship
-Miscalculation (3)
-Navigational Failure
(3)

Support
Service Failure
- No tug assistance
(1)
- No lighted buoy
at TSS (1)

Bad Weather
& physical
environment

-Windy (2)
- Strong wind &
current (1)
- Thunder
storms (1)
- Night navigation
(1)

Ramming (3), Collision (1) & Allision (1)

Death- 0

Figure 5-3 Accimap Model for Ramming, Collision & Allision
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Generally, as shown in Table 5-3, the ramming, collision, and allision accidents were
attributed to the master's miscalculation and the crew’s lack of situational awareness.
In these accidents, poor navigational skills particularly the no observance of the
collision regulations (COLREGS) were highlighted that directly caused the accidents.

Table 5-3. Summary of Ramming, Collision and Allision
DATE

Jan10
Aug13
Jan17

VESSEL
MV
COTABA
TO PRIN
CESS
MV
THOMAS
AQUINAS
LCT
POSEI
DON

NATURE

GRT

AGE

HULL
MATE
RIAL

FER
RY
TYPE

TRADING
LICENSE

LOCA
TION

CAUSAL
FACTOR

CASUA
LTY

RAM
MING

7,977

40

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE

IN PORT

MASTER
MISCALCUL
ATION

0

COLLI
SION/
SINKING

1,405

40

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE

AT TSS

ALLI
SION

1,285

38

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE

IN PORT

Sep17

MV MA
MATILDE

RAM
MING

1,266

46

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE

AT SEA

Sep17

MV
OCEAN
JET 12

RAM
MING

242

19

ALUMI
NUM

PAX

COAST
WISE

IN PORT

MASTER
MISCALCUL
ATION
MASTER
MISCALCUL
ATION
LACK OF
SITUATIO
NAL AWARE
NESS
MASTER
MISCALCUL
ATION

120

0

0

0

To prevent ramming of ports, these ferries should at least have line throwing devices
and enough fenders as an aid to facilitate smooth docking maneuvers. Also, the
majority of these ferries were affected by the wind and current conditions in the area.
However, mariners were not excused from the unpredictable sea conditions and are
expected to be adaptable to them.

Ironically, the casualty for collision accidents is none except for the MV St. Thomas
Aquinas which subsequently sunk after the collision incident. In comparison to the
capsizing and sinking accidents, ramming, collision, and allision accidents are not as
fatal, as long as the ferry’s hull and stability are not breached and they stay upright
and floating.

Another evident contributory factor to these type of accidents was the absence of
support services such as pilots, tug assistance and aids to navigation such as lighted
buoys in the traffic separation scheme (TSS) lanes.
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5.4 Fire
Lastly, Figure 5-4, as shown below, included one (1) fire accident which claimed
forty-two (42) lives.

Poor Organizational Safety Culture
-Weak monitoring and checking of resources,
climate and processes to ensure a safe work
environment
-Leadership/supervision/ oversight inadequate
-Failed to enforce rules and regulation
-Authorized unnecessary hazard
-Violated procedures

Poor Safety
Management

Poor Seamanship
- Maintenance Failure (2)

- No Main Engine Planned
maintenance (1)
- No emergency procedure
(1)
- No maintenance of CO2
fixed extinguishing system

Poor Design,
Construction &
Equipment
-Equipment Failure
(No fire dampers) (1)
- Engine room is not
airtight

Fire (1)

OUTCOME

PHYSICAL/ ACTOR EVENTS,
PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS

No policy and infrastructure
for safety inspector’s
centralized (ship risk profile,
certification and enforcement)
information system

Other Safety Inspections lapses
- Ferries design, construction, equipment and stability
inspection, survey and certification
- Crew training, assessment and certification
-Safety Management System Audit and Certification
- Vessel Safety Enforcement Inspection (VSEI)
-Emergency Readiness Evaluation (ERE)

ORGANIZATIONAL

EXTERNAL

No policy for
Inspector’s
Performance
Oversight

Death- 42

Figure 5-4 Accimap Model for Fire
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Similar to the capsizing and sinking accidents, under the physical, actor, and events
processes and condition level, the fire accident was characterized by the
combination of poor safety management, poor seamanship, and poor design,
construction, and equipment. But unlike the other type of accidents and incidents, it
was not affected by any bad weather.

MV Lite Ferry 16 caught fire because of the absence of planned maintenance of its
main engine. Furthermore, it was aggravated by the absence of fire dampers and
the failure of the fixed fire extinguishing system to work properly.

Similar to the other accidents and incidents, the Poor Ferry Safety Culture was
present in the said ferry partially because of other safety inspection enforcements
lapses which did not include PDI, also. Moreover, planned maintenance is not
practicable to be check during PDI.

Likewise, the said enforcement lapses were rooted in the absence of policies and
infrastructure on the safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk profile, certification, and
enforcement) information system and the safety inspector’s performance oversight.

On one hand, as shown in Table 5-4, the fire accident and the alleged overloading
incident among the other ferries, had the least number.

Table 5-4 Summary of Fire Accident and Alleged Overcrowding Incident
DATE

VESSEL

Aug19

MV LITE
FERRY 16
2019

Apr18

MV VIRGIN
DE
PENAFRANCI
A VII

NATURE

GRT

AGE

HULL
MATE
RIAL

FERRY
TYPE

TRADIN
G
LICENSE

FIRE

992

40

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE

ALLEGED
OVER
CROWD
ING

678

12

STEEL

ROPAX

COAST
WISE
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LOCA T
ION

CAUSAL
FACTOR

CASU
ALTY

AT SEA

NO
PLANNED
MAINTENA
NCE
SYSTEM

42

AT SEA

0

MV Virgin de Penafrancia VII's alleged overloading incident was an example that
passengers were already knowledgeable and had the safety awareness to participate
in the process of improving the entire ferry safety culture. Also, passengers' safety
awareness is another avenue to regulate the ferry industry and improve its safety.

5.5 Summary
In summary, as shown in Table 5-5, all major causal factors per accident and incident
types were tabulated for a clearer understanding..
Table 5-5 Summary of the AcciMaps’ Four Accident and Incident Types
Capsizing
Poor safety
management
Poor seamanship
Poor design,
construction,
stability and
equipment
Bad Weather &
physical
environment
Service Support
Failure
Poor Organization
Safety Culture
PDI lapses

Sinking/
Submerging

Ramming/
Collision/
Allision

Fire




































Other safety


Inspections lapses
Not updated

Typhoon Policy
Not updated MBCA
design &

construction
No inspector
performance


oversight
No safety inspector
computerized


information system
Moreover, Table 5-6, as shown below, is the Summary of
HFACS and AcciMap Causal Factors.
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the Safe Ferry Model,

Table 5-6 Summary of the Safe Ferry Model, HFACS and AcciMap Causal Factors
MODEL OF SAFE
FERRY
Ferry Operator Safety
Culture:

Ships
suitable
intended service

1

for

Well-maintained ships

Properly
operated,
crewed ships

HFACS CAUSAL
FACTORS

Stability failure
Hull failure
Watertight
integrity
failure
Unsafe MBCA
superstructure design
Lack
supply
and
materials
Improper cargo lashing
SMS Failure
Leadership/ oversight
inadequate
Procedure failure
Inaccurate passenger
manifest
Overcrowding
Overloading
Inadequate
support
services
Navigational failure
Master miscalculation
Inadequate manning
Crew Interaction
Personal readiness

ACCIMAP CAUSAL
FACTORS

Poor design,
construction,
equipment and stability

Poor safety
management

Poor crew competence/
seamanship

Regulatory regime:
Appropriate regulations
2
Enforcement

3

4

5

Hazardous Weather
Notification
Emergency Response
Communication
Alerting /Location
Rescue / assistance
resources
Knowledgeable
Passengers

Absent and outdated
regulations
Absence of PDI
PDI Errors
PDI Violations
Squall
Typhoon
Gale
Windy

Absent and outdated
regulations

Emergency and radio
equipment not readily
available

Poor safety
management and
equipment

Alleged Overloading
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PDI and other safety
enforcement lapses

Bad weather

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, relative conclusions will be drawn out from the HFACS and AcciMap
results analysis. Further, corresponding recommendations will be forwarded to the
concerned ferry industry actors for their further validation and final consideration.
6.1 Conclusion

6.1.1 Ferry Operator Safety Culture
Based on the above results and analysis derived from the HFACS coding and the
AcciMap processes, one of the biggest challenges which confront the Philippines
ferry industry is the poor ferry operator’s safety culture. Primarily, it was exhibited by
the poor quality of the design, construction, equipment, and stability of ferries itself.
Particularly, the design, construction, equipment, and stability failures were identified
that caused and/or contributed to the maritime accidents. Additionally, the absence
of proper cargo lashing equipment and fittings, further, aggravated the instability of
ferries. (See Table 6-1)

Jun-08

MV Princess of
the Stars

2

Nov-08

MBCA Don Dexter

3

Dec-09

MV Baleno 9
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Jan-10

5

Aug-13

6

Sep-14

MV Cotabato
Princess
MV St. Thomas
Aquinas
MV Maharlika II
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Bad Weather
and/or floating
object

1

Service Support
Failure

Vessel Name

Poor design,
construction,
stability and
equipment

Date

Poor Seaman
ship

No

Poor Safety
Management

Table 76-1 Summary of Major Causal Factors per Ferry Accident and Incident
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MBCA Alad
Express 2
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Sep-17

MV Ma Matilde
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Sep-17

MV Ocean Jet 12
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Dec-17

Mv Mercraft3
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Apr-18

MV Virgin De
Penafrancia VII
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Aug-19

MV Lite Ferry 16
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Aug-19

MBCA Chichi
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MBCA Keziah
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Aug-19

MBCA Jenny
Vince
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Dec-19

MV Island Roro

20

Nov-20

MBCA Gesu De
Bambino









































Moreover, failures in the safety management system implementation from the
different echelons of the ferry organization, greatly add to the occurrence of the
mishaps.

Similarly, poor crew competence is another accident causal factor plaguing the
country’s domestic ferry industry. Although, poor crew competence is relatively lower
compared to the poor quality of the design, construction, equipment, and stability and
the SMS implementation failures of ferries.

Also, the poor crew competence, the poor quality of the design, construction,
equipment, and stability of ferries, and the SMS implementation failure factors are
quite contradictory to the valid safety certificates possessed by the ferries involved in
the accidents and incidents. Almost all of the ferries out of the twenty (20) ferries
have valid ship and crew safety certificates such as passenger ship safety
certificates, minimum manning certificates, ship station licenses, safety management
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certificates, and the likes. However, there is a dilemma that the safety certificate's
authenticity does not reflect the true condition of the ferry, the crew competence, and
its safety management.
6.1.2 Pre-Departure Inspection
Generally, as shown in Table 6-2, the PDI enforcement is very effective in the areas
of implementing “No sailing policy” and proper cargo lashing, checking the ferries'
safety documents, preventing overcrowding, and checking of life-saving appliances
only because such inspection items are tangible. However, PDI is not so effective in
ensuring ferry stability, verifying the actual operating condition of the ferry itself and
its equipment, preventing overloading, and ensuring an accurate passenger manifest
because such inspection concerns are more technical and require more than the
capability of the naked eye. Additionally, there is also time constraint during PDI.
Moreover, visual scrutiny will not easily reveal the seaworthiness of the ferry,
including its equipment, and the accuracy of passenger manifest.
Table 6-2 PDI strengths and weaknesses
Strengths
 Enforcing “No sailing policy” during
bad weather
 Implementing the proper cargo
lashing
 Checking the completeness and
credibility of ferry and crew safety
documents
 Preventing overcrowding

Weaknesses
 Ensuring ferry’s stability
 Verifying the actual operating
condition of the ferry itself and its
equipment
 Preventing overloading
 Ensuring the passenger manifest
accurateness

 Checking of lifesaving equipment

Also, verifying the level of crew competence and its safety management system
during PDI, aside from the checking the crew and safety management certificates,
poses a great challenge for inspectors because of PDI time constraints.
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6.1.3 PDI and Other Domestic Ferry Safety Enforcement Activities
The Philippines’ poor ferry operators' safety culture, in one way or another, is linked
with the regulators' enforcement lapses. Aside from the fragmented regulatory and
enforcement set up of the country’s maritime agencies, its inspectors and safety
supervisors are not properly equipped to particularly target and profile a single ferry,
the crew, and the ferry company’s safety management. This is due to the absence of
the safety inspector’s centralized (ship risk profile, certification, and enforcement)
information system and the safety inspector’s performance oversight policies and
infrastructure, similar to APCIS of Tokyo MOU.

The ability to have an overall control by specifically profiling, targeting, and validating
the crucial components of the ferry industry status including the ferries, its crew, and
its safety management system is a very powerful tool for safety inspectors in
discharging their functions.

In like manner, collecting and consolidating data about ferries, crew, and safety
management inspections, certifications, surveys, deficiencies, detentions, near
misses, incidents, accidents, search and rescue response, compensation,
penalization, and others are equally vital in the enhancement of the Philippines
domestic ferry safety. These data once consolidated and properly processed, will
paint the complete and precise picture of the country’s domestic ferry industry status.
However, its absence will result in a loosely regulated ferry industry plagued with
many safety regulations violations and accidents.

Overcrowding, overloading, improper lashing of cargoes, sailing during typhoon and
gale and ferries design, construction, and stability related violations of both the
operators, managers, and regulators need to be held accountable and given stiffer
sanctions or even penalization.

Furthermore, a safety inspector's performance oversight body is likewise needed to
counter-check their work procedures and implementation, once in a while. This
mechanism is geared to have regulatory and enforcement transparency.
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6.1.4 Hazardous Weather Notification
Presently, hazardous weather notification and “No sailing policy” about typhoon
bulletin and gale warning have been enforced very effectively. As such, the “No
sailing policy” during with typhoon and gale warning significantly reduced the number
of maritime accidents in the country since 2013. However, results also revealed that
other weather factors and phenomena such as strong wind, current, waves tornado,
and squall still spells danger in the ferry industry especially to those ferries that have
issues with design, construction, and stability. But since, these weather elements at
sea are very unstable, unpredictable, and harsh, the ferries, their crew, and the
management itself should adapt to such physical environment by ensuring that the
ferries are seaworthy, the crew is competent mariners, and that they are religiously
exercising the company’s safety management.
6.1.5 Communication- Alerting/Location
Emergency and radio communication equipment not readily available factor was the
only one identified with this category. Furthermore, its frequency was relatively low.
Nevertheless, there is still a need to emphasize checking these items in future
inspections.

6.1.6 Knowledgeable Passengers
The alleged overloading is one (1) incident which clearly illustrates the above subtopic. The passengers or the riding public, as shown in Badajos (2020), plays a very
crucial role in the process of improving domestic ferry safety. Most often, they are the
victims of these sea mishaps, thus, the more they have to be concerned and vigilant.
6.2 Recommendations
Similar to the above chapters, these research recommendations are laid down using
the Safe Ferry Model format to include Accimap's major causal factors for clearer
presentation. As shown in Table 6-3, hereunder are the author’s recommendations
to further enhance the Philippines domestic ferry safety and other safety enforcement
activities including PDI.
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Table 6-3 Recommendations
MODEL OF
SAFE FERRY

ACCIMAP
MAJOR
CAUSAL
FACTORS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Poor design,
construction,
equipment and
stability

Intensify the campaign for the elimination of
substandard ferries and incompetent crew

Poor safety
management

-by conducting stringent ferry, crew and SMS
inspections, trainings, assessments and
certifications to ensure ferries seaworthiness,
crew’s competence and SMS compliance

Poor crew
competence/
seamanship

-by conducting stringent PDI and regular
VSEI and ERE

Absent and
outdated
regulations

To continuously formulate, revisit and update
maritime safety policies in the furtherance of
ferry safety.

Ferry Operator
Safety Culture:
Ships suitable for
intended service
1

Well-maintained
ships
Properly
operated, crewed
ships
Regulatory
regime:
Appropriate
regulations

To establish a safety inspector’s centralized
information system and a safety inspector’s
performance
oversight
policies
and
infrastructure

2

3

Enforcement

PDI and other
safety
enforcement
lapses

Hazardous
Weather
Notification

Bad weather

To collect and consolidate data pertaining to
ferries, crew and safety management
inspections,
certifications,
surveys,
deficiencies,
detentions,
near
misses,
incidents, accidents, investigations, search
and
rescue
response,
compensation,
penalization and others for processing and
analyzation
To adopt and utilize “now casting” technology
To formulate regulations on other weather
phenomenon
in coordination with the
country’s weather bureau

Emergency
Response
4

5

Communication Alerting /Location
Rescue /
assistance
resources
Knowledgeable
Passengers

Poor safety
management
and equipment

Intensify the campaign for the elimination of
substandard ferries by conducting stringent
ferry inspections and certifications, PDI and
regular VSEI and ERE

To launch an aggressive and continuous
passengers’ safety awareness program
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Detailed Information of 20 selected Domestic Ferry Accidents and Incidents

NO

1

2

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

Jun-08

MV
PRINCESS
OF THE
STAR

SIBUYAN,
ROMBLON

Nov-08

MBCA DON
DEXTER

DIMASALAN
G MASBATE

119

1984

2002

GRT

23,800

13.7

NATURE OF
INCIDENT

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH814

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH42
MISSING
-10

SYNOPSIS
On 20 June 2008, the Princess of the
Stars departed Port of Manila enroute
to Cebu City. In accordance with the
sailing policy, the said vessel was
allowed to sail even when a Tropical
Cyclone Warning Signal (TCWS) was
already
hoisted.
Unfortunately,
Typhoon Frank changed course and
went directly to the path of the said
vessel. At noon of 21 June 2008, MV
Princess of the Stars was able to send
a distress signal. At 1230H, radio
contact was lost. On the very same
day, MV Princess of the Stars
capsized off the coast of San
Fernando, Romblon at the height of
Typhoon Frank.
MBCA Don Dexter, from the Zuniga
Sea Line Pier or Dimasalang Pier,
departed and was bound for Bulan,
Sorsogon on November 4, 2008 at
about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon. At
around 2 o’clock while at the vicinity of
Macaraguit Island, Masbate, the said
motorbanca listed on its port side and
eventually overturned, trapping some
of the passengers inside, resulting to
the death of forty-two 42 passengers
and damage of numerous goods.

NO

3

DATE

Dec-09

VESSEL
NAME

MV BALENO 9

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

VERDE
ISLAND
BATANGAS

120

1992

GRT

199

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SINKING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH-6
MISSING
-44

On or about 262130H December
2009, MV Baleno (departed from
Port of Calapan bound for
Batangas Port. The said vessel
was manned by 14 crew with 9
rolling cargoes.
On or about
2146H of same date, CGS VTMS
PPA Batangas observed an echo
on the radar passing Baco Islands.
On or about 2210H, the echo on
the radar disappeared. On or
about 2230H, CGS Calapan
received a telephone call from CG
Detachment Sta Clara of CGS
Batangas that MV Baleno 9 was in
distress at vicinity Verde Island
and Baco Island. It was reported
that MV Baleno 9 sunk on or about
262230H December 2009.

4

Jan-10

MV
COTABATO
PRINCESS

ILOILO
ARRASTRE
PIER

121

1970

7,977

RAMMING/
COLLISION

LESS
SERIOUS

DEATH-0

On or about 1300H of 04
September 2008, MV Cotabato
Princess allegedly rammed the
Iloilo Arrastre Pier. According to
the Captain Virgilio M Ylagan, the
Master of the MV Cotabato
Princess, that while the vessel was
on docking maneuver at port of
Iloilo City 1300H of 04 September
2008, both main engines stopped,
vessel with enough distance from
the wharf approaching the
assigned berthing space. That
while the docking maneuvering on
progress, The Master noticed that
the stern was drifting away from
the wharf due to strong flood
current and due to strong
northeasterly winds. The Master
controlled the vessel’s momentum
towards the wharf by using both
main engine and bow thruster, but
the vessel’s port bow drifting
towards the wharf that was under
construction. At 1303H of same
date, the vessel impacted the
installed concrete piles.
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NO

5

DATE

Aug-13

VESSEL
NAME

MV THOMAS
AQUINAS

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

CEBU
CHANNEL

123

1973

GRT

1,405

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

COLLISION/
SINKING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH55
MISSING
-65

On 16 August 2013, MV St
Thomas Aquinas, a passengercargo ship, collided with MV
Sulpicio Express Siete at vicinity
off Talisay, Cebu causing it to sink
and resulted to 108 deaths and 29
missing. After leaving the port of
Cebu, MV Sulpicio Express Siete
traveled at a speed of 9 knots
within a channel regulated by the
TSS. Meanwhile, MV St Thomas
Aquinas was sailing inbound when
the two vessels collided. After the
collision, MV St Thomas Aquinas
was flooded and the Master
announced “abandonship”. In a
matter of minutes, MV St Thomas
Aquinas sunk. Many perished
because they were caught
unaware and were trapped inside
the vessel.

NO

6

DATE

Sep-14

VESSEL
NAME

MV
MAHARLIKA II

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

SOUTHERN
LEYTE

124

1984

GRT

1,865

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SINKING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH-2

MV Maharlika 2 departed Lipata Port,
Surigao City on or about 131200H
September 2014 with 13 rolling
cargoes, 90 passengers and 31 crew
members. Seven hours earlier on or
about 0500H, PAGASA issued a Gale
Warning No. 2 for the eastern
seaboard of Mindanao. MV Maharlika
2 experienced favorable weather as it
departed Lipata Port until it reached
Bilaa Point, Surigao City. Thereafter,
MV Maharlika 2 experienced strong
winds and rough sea while navigating
along Surigao Strait. While steadily
traversing the Surigao Strait, the cargo
securing devices progressively failed
to maintain the respective stowage
positions of the rolling cargoes. On or
about 1415H, MV Maharlika 2 listed 34 degrees to starboard side. On or
about 1430H MV Maharlika suffered
steering casualty. On or about 1700H,
the starboard list increased to 40-45
degrees. At 1730H, the Master
announced “Abandonship”. At 1750H,
MV Maharlika 2 sunk at vicinity of Binit
Point.

NO

7

DATE

Jul-15

VESSEL
NAME

MBCA KIM
NIRVANA B

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

ORMOC
PORT

125

2015

GRT

33

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

CAPSIZING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH62

MV Kim Nirvana B is a wooden
passenger motor banca authorized
to load cargo for 60 days after being
issued with special permit. On or
about 02 July 2015 at 1215 o’clock
in the afternoon, MBCA Kim Nirvana
B departed and backed off the Port
of Ormoc with passengers and
cargoes onboard bound to Pilar,
Camotes, Cebu. At around 12:20
o’clock, while MBCA Kim Nirvana B
was approximately 200 meters from
its origin at the Port of Ormoc, she
moved forward making a hard turn to
port. The said motorbanca did not
complete the turn as she listed to
starboard
and
subsequently
capsized. This incident caused the
death of sixty-two (62) passengers.

NO

8

DATE

Dec-16

VESSEL
NAME

MV STARLITE
ATLANTIC 2

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

MARICABAN
ISLAND
BATANGAS

126

1975

GRT

1,407

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SINKING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH-1
MISSING
-18

On 250300H December 2016, MV
Starlite Atlantic was allowed to
take shelter at Pinamucan Point
Anchorage area, Batangas City
with 33 crew onboard. PAGASA
issued a weather bulletin at 0800H
of same date hoisting TWCS No. 2
in Batangas. BY 1100H, PAGASA
hoisted TWCS No. 3 over
Batangas. The MV Starlite Atlantic
went missing and believed to have
sunk within the vicinity of
Maricaban Island at the height of
Typhoon Nina on 26 December
2016. Fourteen (14) crew were
rescued, while, one (1) dead body
was recovered.

NO

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

GRT

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

9

Jan-17

LCT POSEIDON
26 & MV REINA
GENOVEVA

ALLEN SAMAR

1979

1,285

ALLISION/
COLLISION

SERIOUS

DEATH-0
HULL
DAMAGE

10

Jun-17

MBCA ALAD
EXPRESS 2

ROMBLON

2007

12.8

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH-5

127

SYNOPSIS
On or about 060810H January 2017,
LCT Poseidon 26, a roro passenger
ship, while conducting maneuvering
and docking operation at the vicinity
seawater of Port of Balwarteco, Brgy
Looc, Allen, Northern Samar, the
portside of subject vessel’s forward
ramp accidentally hit the portside
freeboard of MV Reina Genoveva of
Montenegro Shipping Line which was
already docked at the port, resulting to
a hull puncture and damages to its
hydraulic piping system.
On or about 091300H June 2017, a
report from a concerned citizen was
received by Coast Guard Station
Romblon that MBCA Alad Express 2
capsized on or about 1200H at vicinity
Agbudia, Romblon, Romblon. Based
on the account of the crewmembers
and some of the passengers during
interrogation, a strong tornado
accompanied with complete darkness
suddenly appeared from the horizon
directly hitting them, tossing them
upward to sideward, making the
motorbanca to suddenly capsized.

NO

11

12

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

Sep-17

MV MA
MATILDE

TABLAS
ROMBON

Sep-17

MV OCEAN JET
12

BATANGAS
PORT

128

1971

1998

GRT

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

1,266

RAMMING/
COLLISION

242

RAMMING /
COLLISION

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

SERIOUS

INJURED51

SERIOUS

INJURED 6
W/
VESSEL
DAMAGE

SYNOPSIS
MV Maria Matilde’s trip from Batangas
City to Odiongan, Romblon was
smooth. However, her voyage from
Odiongan, Romblon to Romblon,
Romblon turned mysterious as she
directly bumped or hit a wall of
mountain rock at the area of incident.
The said vessel sustained major
damage at the upper portion of the
ship’s bow but above the waterline. In
command during the incident was the
Second Officer with able body
seaman, On the Job trainees (OJT’s)
and cadets. The ship’s speed was 1213 knots when it rammed the rock
leaving
fifty-one
(51)
injured
passengers and crew.
On or about 041800H September
2017, MV Ocean Jet 12 rammed the
pier of berth 6 at the Asian Terminal
Incorporated, Port of Batangas,
Batangas City while on docking
maneuver. The said incident injured
one (1) crew and six (6) passengers. It
also damaged the ship’s starboard
bow and anchor and portion of the
pier.

NO

13

DATE

Dec-17

VESSEL
NAME

MV
MERCRAFT3

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

INFANTA
QUEZON

129

2016

GRT

206

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SINKING

SEVE
RITY

VERY
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH-4

On or about 210900H December
2017, MV Mercraft 3 with
passengers onboard departed
Port of Real, Quezon bound to
Polilio Island, Quezon. While
underway at the vicinity of
Dinahican Point, Quezon, the said
vessel encountered strong, big
and
successive
waves.
Accordingly, the Master heard a
loud banging sound within the
starboard bow and noticed that the
vessel was listing to starboard.
The
Master
made
some
precautionary
maneuvers
to
compensate the listing and
prevent the ingress of water
brought by the waves but was in
vain. The whole vessel was
flooded, thus, the Master declared
“abandonship”. The vessel slowly
sunk which resulted to 5 deaths
and 7 missing.

NO

14

DATE

Apr-18

VESSEL
NAME

MV VIRGIN
DE
PENAFRANCI
A VII

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

PORT OF
BANTON,
ROMBLON

130

2006

GRT

678

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

OVERCROWDING

SEVE
RITY

LESS
SERIOUS

CASUA
LTY

SYNOPSIS

DEATH-0

On or about 011700H April 2018, MV
Virgin de Penafrancia VII departed
from Port of Banton bound to Port of
Lucena City via Kawit, Marinduque.
Based on the Master’s Declaration of
Safety Departure (MDSD) duly signed
by the Master, the vessel’s authorized
passenger
capacity
excluding
crewmembers indicated six hundred
eight (608). On or about 092100H
April 2018, Coast Guard Station
Romblon received a forwarded
complaint concerning the alleged
excess passengers onboard the said
vessel. Meanwhile, Coast Guard
Station Southern Quezon was task to
intercept the said vessel upon arrival
at Lucena Port. Head counting
revealed that five hundred ninety-five
(595) passengers were on board.
Later on, it was clarified that the ship’s
Passenger Ship Safety Certificate
(PSSC) was really 608. Further, the
said authorized passenger capacity
was duly supported by an approved
accommodation plan and passenger
insurance coverage.

NO

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

GRT

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

15

Aug-19

MV LITE
FERRY 16

DAPITAN
CITY

1995

992

FIRE

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH-4
MISSING
-39

16

Aug-19

MBCA CHICHI

GUIMARAS
STRAIT

2015

19

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH11

131

SYNOPSIS
On or about 280023H August 2019,
MV Lite Ferry 16 with 10 crew, 28
ancillaries, 207 passengers and 28
rolling cargoes caught fire from its
main engine at vicinity off Tagolo
Point, Dapitan City while enroute from
Bato, Cebu to Dapitan City. This
resulted to 3 deaths and total loss of
the ship.
On or about 031132H August 2019,
MBCA Chi-chi with two (2) crew, two
(2) ancillaries and forty-five (45)
passengers including one (1) child
onboard, departed from Parola Wharf,
Iloilo City to Jordan Wharf, Guimaras.
According to the Boat Captain, said
motorbanca, while underway, he
noticed the sky turned dark and the
wind became strong at the starboard
side and the visibility became poor.
The said boat cannot withstand the
strong wind causing the MBCA to list
to port. The passengers, likewise,
shifted further to portside. As a result,
she overturned and eventually
capsized.

NO

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

AREA

YEAR
BUILT

GRT

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

17

Aug-19

MBCA KEZIAH

GUIMARAS
STRAIT

1972

5

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH 0

18

Aug-19

MBCA JENNY
VINCE

GUIMARAS
STRAIT

2004

10.6

CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH20

132

SYNOPSIS
On or about 031138H August 2019, MBCA
Keziah 2 with two (2) crew and three (3)
ancilliaries, without passengers onboard,
departed from Parola Wharf, Iloilo City to
Jordan Wharf, Guimaras. According to the
Boat Captain, said motorbanca, while
underway, approximately halfway to her
destination, they encountered a sudden
strong wind. The strong wind tilted the
motorbanca to portside. The crew and
ancillaries attempted to stabilize and
balance the MBCA but failed. Eventually,
the boat capsized at 1205H of the same
date.
On or about 031138H August 2019, MBCA
Keziah 2 with two (2) crew and three (3)
ancilliaries, without passengers onboard,
departed from Parola Wharf, Iloilo City to
Jordan Wharf, Guimaras. According to the
Boat Captain, said motorbanca, while
underway, approximately halfway to her
destination, they encountered a sudden
strong wind. The strong wind tilted the
motorbanca to portside. The crew and
ancillaries attempted to stabilize and
balance the MBCA but failed. Eventually,
the boat capsized at 1205H of the same
date.

NO

DATE

VESSEL
NAME

YEAR
BUILT

AREA

GRT

NATURE
OF
INCIDENT

SEVE
RITY

CASUA
LTY

19

Dec-19

MV ISLAND
RORO

CAMOTES
PORT

1978

196

CAPSIZING

SERIOUS

DEATH-0

20

Nov-20

MBCA GESU
DE BAMBINO

ATIMONAN
QUEZON

2010

19

SUBMERGIN
G/
CAPSIZING

VERY
SERIOUS

DEATH-1

133

SYNOPSIS
On or about 311145H August
2019, MV Island Roro-I, a
passenger-cargo vessel departed
Port pf Danao, Danao City with 8
crew,
11
ancillaries,
149
passengers
and
10
rolling
cargoes. At 1445H of same date,
the
said
vessel,
while
disembarking a ten (10) wheeler
truck upon her arrival at Consuelo
Port, San Francisco, Camotes,
capsized.
On or about 301140H November
2020, a crew named Jomel Del
Moro pf passenger MBCA Gesu
de Bambino was found lifeless at
a location not far from Atimonan
Port. On or about 1207H, the said
motorbanca was flooded by
seawater which resulted to the
submerging of motorbanca with
eighteen (18) passengers and four
(4) crew on board.

Appendix B Results of HFACS Coding
MV Princess of the Stars, 2008
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations

decided to proceed enroute even with typhoon
signal
shifting of cargo
/ improper lashing

PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight

Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate
operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

erroneous entries in the cert of stability

decided to proceed enroute even with typhoon
signal
modification of c deck
to pax accomodation
shifting of cargo / improper lashing
failure to implement safety management system

shifting of cargo / improper lashing
decided to proceed enroute even with typhoon
signal
typhoon
modification of c deck to pax accomodation
improper lashing
erroneous entries in the cert of stability

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

typhoon evasion failure
decided to proceed enroute even with typhoon
signal
ballasting caused
free surface effect

shifting of cargo / improper lashing

134

MBCA Don Dexter, 2008
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

overcrowding

overcrowding

Passengers shifting to portside

Passengers shifting to portside

overcrowding

squall
mbca design/ outriggers cracking
Passengers shifting to portside

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

overcrowding

Total

135

MV Baleno 9, 2010
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight

Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

Passenger manifest inaccuracy

passed through uncharted area
Passenger staying at the cargo deck
Passenger manifest inaccuracy
cargo shifting / improper lashing of cargoes

passed through uncharted area
Passenger staying at the cargo deck
Passenger manifest inaccuracy
cargo shifting / improper lashing of cargoes

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine

AV 100

cargo shifting / improper lashing of cargoes

Exceptional

Total

136

hit an unidentified object
vessel design / hull integrity / hull raptured

passed through uncharted area

Passenger staying at the cargo deck
cargo shifting / improper lashing of cargoes
Passenger manifest inaccuracy

MV Cotabato Princess, 2010
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation

no medical practitioner/ c/m and 4/e with expired
seamans book and prc license

Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources

OC XXX

OP XXX

no medical practitioner/ c/m and 4/e with expired
seamans book and prc license
no pilot

OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight

Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervisiin
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

no tugboat assistance

no tugboat assistance
no pilot
no medical practitioner/ c/m and 4/e with expired
seamans book and prc license

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine
AV 100
Exceptional

137

sudden change of current and strong ne wind
no tugboat assistance

master miscalculation

MV St Thomas Aquinas, 2013
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures

OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision

failure to reduce speed
both vessels failed to communicate
SE7 inside TSS inbound lane

failure to reduce speed
both vessels failed to communicate
SE7 inside TSS inbound lane

SP XXX

Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine
AV 100
Exceptional

138

night navigation 9pm
no lighted bouys at TSS (by CPA)

failure to reduce speed
both vessels failed to communicate

SE7 inside TSS inbound lane

MV Maharlika II, 2014
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

improper lashing of cargoes

improper lashing of cargoes

improper lashing of cargoes

improper lashing of cargoes

cargo shifting/ improper lashing of cargoes

gale warning
steering casualty
cargo shifting/ improper lashing of cargoes
flooding at steering room

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

improper lashing of cargoes

Total

139

MBCA Kim Nirvana, 2015
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation

overcrowding
overloading

Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

overcrowding
overloading
hard port with stbd ahead and port astern

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine
AV 100

hard port with stbd ahead and port astern
overcrowding
overloading

Exceptional

Total

140

strong waves
mbca design with 2 decks

hard port with stbd ahead and port astern

overcrowding
overloading

MV Starlite Atlantic 2, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision

no back-up power

communication from ship to VTMS and Coy
choosing sheltering area

choosing sheltering area
communication from ship to VTMS and Coy

SP XXX
SF XXX

SV XXX

Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

no back-up power

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

typhoon
car deck design is open
no back-up power

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors

choosing sheltering area

Routine
Exceptional

communication from ship to VTMS and Coy

Total

141

LCT Poseidon 26, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

Total

142

no procedure on safe docking

no guidance on safe docking

windy

master miscalculation

MBCA Alad Express 2, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine
AV 100
Exceptional
Total

143

overcrowding
Passenger manifest inaccuracy

Passenger manifest inaccuracy

Passenger manifest inaccuracy

strong tornado
mbca design

overcrowding

inaccurate Passenger manifest

MV Ma Matilde, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

no bell book / QM's logbook

SMS on navigational watchkeeping distance to
nearest shoreline

OP XXX

no captain night order book
look outs not using binoculars

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

dark with thunderstorms

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction

OJT Jabad noticed the unusual deviation of route
but failed to inform 2nd Officer
QM Fernandez stated that they are on the right
track

Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors

second officer lack of situational awareness
failed to inform the master

Routine
Exceptional

Total

144

MV Ocean Jet 12, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
Skill-based errors
AE 100
Decisions and judgement
errors
AE 200
Perceptual errors
AV XXX
Violations
AV 000
Routine
AV 100
Exceptional
Total

145

no procedure on safe docking and familiarization
no safe speed regulation

no guidance on safe docking

windy

lack of familiarization

master miscalculation

MV Mercraft 3, 2017
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation

inadequate manning
inaccurate passenger manifest

Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures

OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
SF XXX

SV XXX

inadequate manning

failure to control passenger during distress
situation
failure to close engine room cover

failure to control passenger during distress
situation
failure to close engine room cover

Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

inadequate manning
inaccurate passenger manifest

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

possibly hit by a hard submerged object
gale warning
vessel and structural design / seaworthiness /
hull raptured

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000

AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors

failure to control passenger during distress
situation
failure to close engine room cover

Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine

inadequate manning
inaccurate passenger manifest

Exceptional

Total

146

MV Virgin de Penafrancia VII, 2018
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

amended passenger capacity in the PSSC

amended passenger capacity in the PSSC

amended passenger capacity in the PSSC

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors

failure to submit updated safety docs

Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

Total

147

MV Lite Ferry 16, 2019
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

engine room is not airtight / no fire dampers

no main engine planned maintenance
no maintenance co2 fixed extinguishing system

OP XXX

no emergency procedure

no maintenance co2 fixed extinguishing system
no emergency procedure
engine room is not airtight / no fire dampers
no main engine planned maintenance

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

no maintenance co2 fixed extinguishing system
no emergency procedure
engine room is not airtight / no fire dampers

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

no main engine planned maintenance

Total

148

149

MBCA Jenny Vince, MBCA Chi-Chi, MBCA Keziah 2, 2019
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation

inaccurate passenger manifest
distress apparatus and radio communication
equipment not readily available

Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

distress apparatus and radio communication
equipment not readily available

distress apparatus and radio comm eqpt not
readily available

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

squall
mbca design unstable
canvass awning traps pax
wearing of lifejacket prohibited
distress apparatus and radio communication
equipment not readily available
SAR teams has no rescue equipment

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

inaccurate passenger manifest

150

151

MV Island Roro-1, 2019
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX

PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation
Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision

oily cargo decks
cargo shifting

oily cargo decks
cargo shifting

SP XXX
SF XXX

SV XXX

Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

oily cargo decks
cargo shifting

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors

overloaded 10 wheeler truck

Routine
Exceptional

Total

152

MBCA Gesu de Bambino, 2020
Reported HFACS Factors
Philippines Ferry Industry Human and Org. Factors

Contributory Factors

Outside Factors (PCG PDI)
PDIR XXX
PDI and Other Related Regulation
PDIR 000
Rules and Regulations
PDIE XXX
PDI Enforcement Related Issues
PDIE 000
Absence of PDI
PDIE100
PDI Error
PDIE 200
PDI Violation

distress apparatus and radio communication
equipment not readily available
passenger manifest inaccuracy

Organizational Influences
OR XXX
Resource Management
OR 000
Human resources
OR 100
Technological resources
OR 200
Equipment/Facility resources
OC XXX
Organizational Climate
OC 000
Structure
OC 100
Policies
OC 200
Culture
OP XXX
Organizational Process
OP 000
Operations
OP 100
Procedures
OP 200
Oversight
Unsafe supervision
SI XXX
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne and shore
supervision
SP XXX
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000
Shipborne operations
SF XXX
Failed to correct known problems
SF 000
Shipborne related
shortcomings
SV XXX
Supervisory violations
SV 000
Shipborne violations

mbca left 1 crew on water after cutting the anchor
rope entangled at the propeller

mbca left 1 crew on water after cutting the anchor
rope entangled at the propeller

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental factors
Physical environment
Technological environment

squall
mbca design flaw
distress apparatus and radio communication
equipment not readily available

Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel Factors
Crew Interaction
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts
AE XXX
Errors
AE 000
AE 100

AV XXX

AE 200
Violations
AV 000
AV 100

Skill-based errors
Decisions and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors

master miscalculation

Routine
Exceptional

passenger manifest inaccuracy

153

